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The Deductibility of
Stock Redemption Expenses
Kenneth S. Cohen
Prior to 1970, there were three distinct lines of authority on the ques-
tion of the deductibility of stock redemption expenses. The three
lines of cases did not refer to one another, however, and consequently
there was no clear rule on how redemption expenses were to be treated.
In 1970 the Supreme Court determined that the origin and character test
should he applied to the related area of stock appraisal litigation ex-
penses. Through an extensive case analysis the author attempts to rec-
oncile the previous law and then evaluates the effect of the Supreme
Court decisions on that law. He concludes that although prior law may
remain largely unaffected by the application of the origin and character
test, the advent of a single test could be a clear improvement over the
chaos that has existed.
I. INTRODUCTION3 HEN A CORPORATION redeems' its own stock, the trans-
action may be characterized in several ways. First, since the
corporation is returning some of its "capital"2 to its shareholders,
every redemption is, in some sense, a partial liquidation, although
not necessarily in the same
sense as that term is used in
THE AUTHOR: KENNETH S. COHEN
(B.S., New York University; LL.B., section 346 of the Code.' Sec-
Harvard University) is an Associate Pro- ondly, a redemption may have
fessor of Law at Case Western Reserve certain characteristics of a re-
University and is admitted to the Ohio
Bar. His teaching specialties are Busi- organization, again not neces-
ness Planning, Corporate Taxation, and sarily in the sense of the statu-
Law and Accounting. tory definition of section 368,
but in the broader sense of a
"restructuring of the corporate entity or enterprise."4 Finally, every
1 The word "redeem" as used in the Internal Revenue Code covers both redeem
and repurchase in corporate parlance. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 317 (b).
2 The term "capital" is used in the broad sense of "proprietorship," since the repur-
chase itself may be "out of" earned surplus or capital surplus with no reduction of
stated capital. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6 (rev. 1969) [herein-
after cited as MBCA).
a INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 346. Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, all ref-
erences to "the Code" or to specific sections are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
whether in text or notes.
4 B. BIn'nER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 5 5.07 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EusTrcEj. In
the context of a single corporation, the concept of reorganization usually refers to re-
capitalization.
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redemption may be thought of as a purchase by the corporation of
an asset, namely its own stock, though today treasury stock is gen-
erally not considered an asset of the corporation.- It is because
many redemptions seem to fit somehow into all of these categories,
yet squarely into none of them, that the courts have had consider-
able trouble in deciding whether the corporation may deduct or
must capitalize the incidental expenses6 incurred in carrying out a
redemption transaction.7  Indeed, an extensive and confusing body
of law has developed on the question.'
That body of law was further complicated by the 1970 Supreme
Court decisions of Woodward v. Commissioner9 and United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,' which dealt with the related issues sur-
rounding the tax treatment of expenses incurred in litigation under-
taken to value the stock of shareholders who dissent from some
major corporate action. The primary focus of this article will be
on the effect of Woodward and Hilton upon the prior cases, which
can be placed into three general categories: the partial liquidation
cases, the simple acquisition cases, and the business purpose cases.
5 See S. DAVIDSON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN ACCOUNTING ch. 26-15 (1970);
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, INc., APB OPINION
No. 6 5 12.b (1965); Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations,
79 HARV. L. REv. 303, 305-06 (1965).
6 Such expenses may include legal fees, accounting fees and professional appraisal
fees. See Maier, Deductibility of Expenses Incurred in Corporate Reorganization and
Liquidations, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 253, 274-77.
7 No section of the Code specifically covers the problem although several deal with
it in a more general fashion. Section 162 allows the deduction of all ordinary and
necessary expenses of a trade or business. Section 164(a) allows the deduction of
certain state and local taxes. Section 165 allows the deduction of certain losses. Sec-
tion 248 allows amortization of organizational expenditures. And section 263 prohibits
the deduction of most capital expenditures. See Carruthers, How to Treat the Expenses
of Organization, Reorganization and Liquidation, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
1055 (1966).
8 For an excellent treatment of this subject through 1966 see D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS
PLANNING 540-46 (1966). See also BITKER & EUSTICE 55 5.04, 5.07; Krane, De-
ducting Legal and Accounting Fees: Selected Problems, 44 TAXES 7, 10-11 (1966);
Weissman, Allowable Deductions on the Formation, Reorganization and Liquidation
of a Corporation, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 681, 719-22 (1959); Note, Income Tax Deductions
on Corporate Termination, 9 TAX. L. REv. 490, 495-98 (1954). For general discus-
sions of expenses of organization, reorganization and liquidation, see Carruthers, supra
note 7, at 1055; Grossman, Tax Treatment of Professional Fees Related to Asset Acquisi-
tions and Changes in Business Entities, 45 TAXES 880 (1967); Maier, Deductibility
of Expenses Incurred in Corporate Reorganization and Liquidations, U. So. CAL. 1968
TAX INST. 253; Note, Certain Tax Aspects of Organization, Reorganization, and Liqui-
dation Costs, 10 STAN. L. REV. 112 (1957).
9 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
10 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
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II. THE PRIOR LAW OF STOCK REDEMPTION EXPENSES
A. The Partial Liquidation Cases
As a general rule, the expenses generated by complete liquida-
tion of a corporation are deductible in the year they are incurred."
However, expenses of corporate reorganization are generally not de-
ductible and must be capitalized.2 From these principles there de-
veloped a line of decisions which have been called the "partial liqui-
dation" cases.' 3 Their thrust is that if the dominant aspect of a re-
demption is partial liquidation rather than reorganization, the ex-
penses are deductible. As with most rules where the operative lan-
guage is "dominant aspect" or the like, the rule has been easier to
state than to apply.
The partial liquidation cases began with Mills Estate, Inc. v.
Commissioner4 where the corporate taxpayer held all of the stock
of another corporation and operated certain improved real estate.
The taxpayer sold the real estate and distributed the proceeds of
the sale to its shareholders pro rata. In the process, the corporate
charter was amended to reduce the capital stock of the corpora-
tion.'5 The shareholders surrendered 44 percent of their stock in
exchange for the proceeds of the real estate sale. The remaining
shares were exchanged for an equal number of new shares with the
same par value. In the course of the transaction, the corpoiation
incurred legal fees of approximately $20,000, which it claimed as
an ordinary deduction.
The Tax Court,' speaking through Judge Raum, discussed cases
dealing with expenses of reorganization and cases dealing with ex-
penses of complete liquidation. The court then stated:
"1 Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CuM. BULL.
6; see BITrK.ER & Eus'ncE 5 11.68.
1 There are some exceptions. BITTKER & EUSTICE 5 5.07. However, in the con-
text of a recapitalization-reorganization (see note 4 supra) the rule stated in the text
seems well established. See, e.g., Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner,
148 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1945); Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 268
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941).
Is See D. HERwITZ, supra note 8, at 540. Professor Herwitz is the only author to
date to explore the fact that there has been more than one line of cases developing in
this area.
14206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g in part, af'g in part 17 T.C. 910 (1951).
15 The reduction of capital was required by New York law, 206 F.2d at 245. The
capital stock of the corporation was reduced from $5,000,000, represented by 50,000
shares of $100 par value, to $2,800,000, represented by 28,000 shares of $100 par
value.
16 17 T.C. 910 (195 1).
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The expenditures involved herein have characteristics that par-
take of both lines of decisions. Petitioner's legal expenses were
undoubtedly incurred in substantial part in order to amend its char-
ter and reduce authorized capitalization, thereby providing for the
acquisition and retirement of its stock followed by the issuance of
new stock in reduced amount. This aspect of the transaction cer-
tainly brings the case within the first line of authority [the reor-
ganization cases]. However, the actual distribution of assets in
partial liquidation was also a significant factor with respect to
which the legal fees were paid, and it is difficult to perceive why
the cost of a partial liquidation should be any the less an ordinary
and necessary business expense than the cost of a complete liquida-
tion.17
The court went on to allocate the legal fees in question, holding,
somewhat arbitrarily, that half were incurred in "reconstituting"' 8
the stock of the taxpayer and half were incurred in the distribution
of assets. The latter were held to be deductible.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed2" and held that no part
of the expenditure was deductible. After stating that allocation
was improper and that "'the entire proceeding must be viewed as a
single transaction',"' the court found that the transaction was "es-
sentially a reorganization - a change in the corporate structure for
the benefit of future operations." The expenses were incurred in
the creation of "an intangible asset . . . its altered corporate struc-
ture; and, as were the costs of its original organization, these ex-
penditures were capital in nature."'
Finally, the court found that since the issue involved the corpo-
ration as opposed to its stockholders, "whether part of what was
done was a partial liquidation under section 115" of the 1939 Code
was irrelevant.2 3
Responding to the Second Circuit's decision in Mills, the Tax
Court became more cautious in its approach to the problem. Except
for one case decided while the appeal in Mills was pending, it
17 ld. at 915.
181d.
19 The opinion was reviewed by the court. Two judges dissented, questioning the
rule that expenses of complete liquidation are deductible, but stating that even if such
expenses are deductible, the expenditures in the case at bar were incident to the reor-
ganization of the corporation and not its liquidation. Id.
20 Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
21 Id. at 246.
22 Id.
281d.
24 Tobacco Prods. Export Corp., 18 T.C. 1100 (1952), modified on other grounds,
21 T.C. 625 (1954), not acquiesced in, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 11, appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 4 P-H 1955 FED. TAXES 5 71,121 (2d Cir. 1955). There, the corporate
taxpayer, which was in the importing business, held approximately 56,000 shares-of
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uniformly held against the taxpayer. In Standard Linen Service,
Inc.,25 the corporate taxpayer operated a laundry and a linen sup-
ply business, the latter partially through a wholly-owned subsid-
iary. The taxpayer liquidated the subsidiary and distributed the
linen supply assets to one of the taxpayer's shareholders in exchange
for his stock.28  The shares were cancelled and the corporate charter
was amended to reduce the corporation's capital. In denying a de-
duction for the expenses of the transaction, the Tax Court stated
that the taxpayer had failed to show that "no part" of the expendi-
ture "represented the cost of a capital item.' 27  Similar language
was used by the Tax Court to deny a deduction in Farmers Union
Corp. v. Commissioner."8 There the expenses were incurred in the
distribution of the inventory and related assets of one of the corpo-
rate businesses in exchange for stock held by several shareholders.
The test employed in these cases was more restrictive than that im-
plied by the Second Circuit in Mills, which required only a show-
ing that the transaction was not "essentially" a reorganization.-
the stock of another corporation, the business of which was unrelated to the taxpayer's.
The taxpayer distributed the 56,000 shares together with some cash to its shareholders
pro rata in exchange for approximately 90 percent of its own stock. After allocating
a certain percentage of the legal and other expenses to abandoned plans of "partial
liquidation," the Tax Court, on the authority of its decision in Mills Estate, allocated
half of the remaining expensees to the distribution of assets and allowed a deduction
for that half. After the Second Circuit's reversal of Mills, the opinion in Tobacco
Products was modified, upon the taxpayer's motion relating to another issue. How-
ever, the portion of the earlier opinion dealing with the deductibility of the redemp-
tion expenses was left undisturbed. 21 T.C. 625 (1954).
2533 T.C. 1 (1959), acquiesced in, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 7.
26The redeemed stock had been purchased from some of the taxpayer's former share-
holders upon an agreement that the corporation would redeem it in exchange for the
linen supply assets. The Commissionee argued that the transaction was in reality a
sale of the linen supply assets by the taxpayer to the purchaser of the stock. However,
the Tax Court held that what had in fact taken place was a sale of stock followed by a
"partial liquidation." Id. at 14.
2 7 Id. at 17.
2829 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1039, 1054 (1960), aff'd, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cit.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962). In Farmers Union, the taxpayer, while retaining its real
estate holdings, distributed the inventory and related assets of its mercantile business
in exchange for stock held by seven of its 134 stockholders. See also Stephen L. Mor-
row, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1342, 1365 (1967), where the Tax Court denied a deduction
for legal expenses on the ground that the taxpayer corporation had failed to show
which portion of the expense related to the redemption of its stock and which re-
lated to the sale of the balance of its stock by the taxpayer's sole shareholder to a third
party. The court also said that, even assuming all of the expenses were related to the
redemption, there would still be a failure of proof on the part of the taxpayer "be-
cause not every expense of a partial liquidation is deductible as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense." Id. at 1365 (citing Standard Linen Service, 33 T.C. 1 (1959),
acquiesced in, 1960'2 CuM. BULL. 7).
29 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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The Tax Court decision in Farmers Union was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit."°
However, one Tax Court holding of nondeductibility in this line
of decisions was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. In Gravois Planing
Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Beckemeier, who owned 50 percent of
the corporation's outstanding stock, decided to retire. Pursuant to
a preexisting first refusal agreement, he offered his shares to the
corporation. After some discussion, it was decided that Beckemeier
would sell to one of the three other shareholders, Landgraf, a suffi-
cient number of shares to equalize the stock holdings among the
three shareholders. The balance would then be redeemed by the
corporation. Since the corporation did not possess sufficient cash to
cover the full purchase price of the shares to be redeemed, it was
agreed that it would pay for them, in part, with certain improved
real estate and with a paid-up life insurance policy on Beckemeier's
life. Beckemeier insisted, and it was agreed, that the corporation
lease back the real estate for a period of 10 years. Beckemeier went
off the corporation's payroll, and performance of the agreement pro-
ceeded smoothly. Two days later he sold the agreed number of
shares to Landgraf. Thereafter, a law firm, which Beckemeier had
consulted with respect to his proposed retirement, was retained by
the corporation. In the ensuing transactions, Beckemeier's remain-
ing shares were redeemed and cancelled by the corporation, and the
articles of the corporation were amended to reduce its stated capital.
The law firm, making no separate charge to Beckemeier, submitted
its bill for $2,500 to the corporation, and the corporation paid it.
The Tax Court, in denying a deduction for this expense, saw no
essential difference between this case and Standard Linen.32 In the
main, it felt that the services rendered by the attorneys were "neces-
sary steps in the redemption and cancellation of the stock of Becke-
meier and the recapitalization of the corporation." ' The court also
said that some of the fees were paid for legal services rendered to
Beckemeier personally rather than to the corporation."4
In reversing, the court of appeals, 35 speaking through then Judge
Blackmun, first summarized the existing case law:
30 Farmers Union Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 861 (1962).
31299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'g 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mein. 711 (1960).
32 Gravois Planing Mill Co., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 711, 717 (1960).
33Id.
4 Id.
25 Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
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Legal fees and other expenses of a partial liquidation may be de-
ductible, within the statutory definition, as ordinary and necessary
expenses paid in carrying on the business .... Where, however,
a partial liquidation is accompanied by the corporation's recapitali-
zation or reorganization, the transaction is to be viewed as a whole
and its dominant aspect is to govern the tax character of the ex-
penditures.3
The court went on to hold that the "dominant aspect" of the transac-
tion at hand was partial liquidation rather than recapitalization.
[H]ere, as distinguished from the Second Circuit's conclusion in
Mills Estate (with which we express no agreement or disagree-
ment), the dominant aspect ofhe Gravois transaction was the
liquidation of the Beckemeier shares and not the recapitalization.
... Although there was, of course, a desire on the part of all to
keep the organization going, the basic problem with which they
struggled was that of the disposition of the outstanding Beckemeier
stock and was not one directed to the change or any desired im-
provement in the form of the corporate structure. Stock retire-
ment, that is, partial liquidation, was the problem and it was the
essence of what transpired.37
Although the corporation's stated capital was reduced and article
amendments were filed with the Secretary of State, the court saw
this as a secondary rather than the dominant aspect of the transac-
tion. Finally, the court found nothing in the record to justify a
conclusion that any part of the legal expense was incurred for the
benefit of Beckemeier personally. 38
It may be significant that all of the cases discussed above were
decided under the 1939 Code.39 Under section 115(i) of that Act,
a partial liquidation was defined as a "distribution by a corporation
in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock, or one
of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption
of all or a portion of its stock."40 Thus, under the 1939 Code, every
redemption was a partial liquidation. Of course, not every redemp-
tion qualified for sale or exchange treatment for the shareholder in-
volved. To receive such treatment, it had to be shown that the re-
demption distribution was not essentially equivalent to the distribu-
tion of a taxable dividend.4' Dividend nonequivalence could be
demonstrated primarily in one of two ways. If the redemption was
36 Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 209.
38 Id.
9 Int Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 1.
40 d., ch. 1, § 115(i), 53 Star. 48.
41Id. § 115(g).
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non pro rata, it would ordinarily qualify.4" Also, if the redemption
resulted from a "corporate contraction" or legitimate shrinkage in
the corporation's business activities, the shareholder whose shares
were redeemed could qualify for sale or exchange treatment.43
Thus, there were two types of partial liquidation of any mo-
ment: One involving a liquidation of some shareholder interest in
the corporation; the other involving a liquidation of corporate busi-
ness activities themselves.44
Under the 1954 Code, the two types of transactions are sepa-
rated so that section 302 covers non pro rata distributions and section
346 covers distributions resulting from contractions of the business
enterprise. Only transactions falling under section 346 are termed
"partial liquidations"; section 302 transactions are merely "redemp-
tions." This split presented a temptation to permit a deduction for
expenses of a section 346 transaction and to deny a deduction for
expenses falling under section 302. Moreover, such treatment makes
considerable sense. Since it is the corporation which is seeking the
deduction, presumably one should be concerned with what is hap-
pening at the corporate level rather than effects at the shareholder
level.45 More specifically, the analogy to a complete liquidation
upon which the deduction is based is more apt in the case of a sec-
tion 346 transaction than in the case of a section 302 redemption.
Thus, with respect to both section 346 partial liquidations and sec-
tion 331 complete liquidations, the Code contemplates that there will
be corporate contraction and pro rata distribution.4  Further, the
42 See B'TKER & EUSTICE 1 9.02; Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.11(g)-1(a) (2) (1953).43 See BITrKER & EUSTICE 5 9.02. Other factors were considered as well, the
most important being whether there was a legitimate business purpose foe the redemp-
tion. Id. However, in many of the earlier "business purpose" redemptions the fac-
tor of corporate contraction was present. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 311-12
n.11 (1970).
44 Cf. Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L
REv. 866, 897-98 (1961).
45The Senate Finance Committee in describing its action with fespect to sections
302 and 346 stated:
Your committee, as did the House bill, separates into their significant ele-
ments the kind of transactions now incoherently aggregated in the definition
of a partial liquidation. Those distributions which may have capital-gain
characteristics because they are not made pro rata among the various share-
holders would be subjected, at the shareholder level, to the separate tests de-
scribed in [§§ 301 to 3181. On the other hand, those distributions char-
acterized by what happens solely at the corporate level by reason of the assets
distributed would be included as within the concept of partial liquidation.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
46 It should be noted that while the "classic" section 346 transaction will be pro
rata, this is not necessary to qualify under that action. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 346(b)-(c).
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tax effects of both partial and complete liquidations are described
in the same Code sections, and these tax effects are identical. Under
section 336 no gain or loss is recognized by the corporation upon a
distribution of property in "partial or complete liquidation," and un-
der section 331 shareholders receive sale or exchange treatment for
distributions in complete or partial liquidation. In short, the whole
philosophy behind the treatment given to a section 346 partial liqui-
dation appears to be that, for tax purposes, it should make little
difference whether the contraction of a corporation takes place in
whole or in part.47
On the other hand, a section 302 redemption resembles a com-
plete liquidation merely in that corporate assets are being distributed
to the shareholders. There is no contraction of the business in a
section 302 transaction and the distribution is non pro rata. Further,
in a section 302 transaction, because of the .non pro rata nature of
the distribution, there is a shifting of the interests of the sharehold-
ers - an element at least prima facie indicative of recapitaliza-
tion.48
4 7 The extent to which the analogy between complete and partial liquidation actual-
ly applies to the expenses incurred in such transactions may depend upon the rationale
for allowing deduction of expenses of complete liquidation in the first instance. If the
rationale is that the corporation will no longer be in existence to enjoy the benefit of
any kind of expense, the analogy is weakened by the fact that in a partial liquidation
the corporation continues. On the other hand, if the rationale for allowing deduction
of complete liquidation expenses is that these expenses are connected with the distribu-
tion of assets for which the corporation will have no further use, the analogy appears
apt. That the latter view predominates is indicated by the following statement in
Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962): "The the-
ory most frequently advanced ...is that expenditures of liquidation do not concern
the creation or continuance of a capital asset." Id. at 206. Perhaps something can also
be gleaned from the fact that, for an accr'ual basis taxpayer, expenses of complete li-
quidation are deductible in the year incurred rather than in the year of dissolution of
the corporation. See, e.g., J. Gilmore Fletcher, 16 T.C. 273 (1951); Rite-way Prods.,
Inc., 12 T.C. 475 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CuM. BULL. 3. This fact would also
indicate that the rationale for allowing the deduction is that the corpoeation has no
further use for the assets, rather than that the corporation is terminating its existence.
By comparison, unamortized organizational expenses appear to be deductible (as a
loss) only in the year of dissolution. See, e.g., Liquidating Co., 33 B.T.A. 1173, 1187-
89 (1936), not acquiesced in, XV-2 CuM. BULL. 39 (1936), remanded pursuant to
compromise offer, 3 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 5 2171.56 (9th Cir. 1937);
Newport Co. v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Wis. 1940). But cf. Shellabar-
ger Grain Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 177, 185 (7th Cir. 1944) (deduction
allowed prior to actual dissolution where corporation had filed a statement of intent
to dissolve with the secretary of state and had ceased all operations except those neces-
sary to wind up its affairs). See generally Note, Income Tax Deductions on Corporate
Termination, 9 TAx L REv. 490 (1954).
48 Unfortunately, one is hampered in determining what constitutes a "recapitaliza-
tion" by the absence of any judicial or legislative definition of that term beyond the
broad definition contained in Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194,
202 (1942), i.e., a "reshuffling of a capital structure, within the framework of an
19731
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Unfortunately, allowing the deduction of expenses of section
346 transactions, while denying it for expenses connected with sec-
tion 302 transactions, would not be in accord with many of the cases
decided under the 1939 Code. Thus, in Mills Estate, Standard Linen,
and Farmers Union there was corporate contraction, but the deduc-
tion was denied. To be sure in Standard Linen and Farmers Union
there was a non pro rata distribution as well, thus infusing into the
transactions elements of what today would be covered by both sec-
existing corporation." However, Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), example (12) (1973),
applies the term "recapitalization" to the following facts:
Corporation R has 2,000 shares of class A stock outstanding. Five share-
holders own 300 shares each and five shareholders own 100 shares each. In
preparation for the retirement of the five major shareholders, corporation R,
in a single and isolated transaction, has a recapitalization in which each share
of class A stock may be exchanged either for five shares of new class B non-
convertible preferred stock plus 0.4 share of new class C common stock, or
for two shares of new class C common stock. As a result of the exchanges,
each of the five major shareholders receives 1,500 shares of class B noncon-
vertible preferred stock and 120 shares of class C common stock. The re-
maining shareholders each receives 200 shares of class C common stock.
See also ;Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(e) (1)-(5) (1955) giving examples of a "recapitaliza-
tion" under section 368(a) (1) (E).
While it is true that in each of these examples new securities are issued, the examples
also seem to contemplate some shifting of shareholder or creditor interest. Notably,
none of the examples so much as refer to whether the corporation's stated capital is
changed (a factor apparently relied upon in the early partial liquidation cases as in-
dicating a "recapitalization." See, e.g., Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d
244 (2d Cir. 1953) ). Thus where no new securities are issued, as is the case in the
typical share redemption situation, it would appear to be more sound to rely upon a
shifting of shareholder interest as indicative of a "recapitalization" than to rely upon a
reduction of stated capital. Cf. Bass v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1942)
(the lack of a change in stated capital was held to be indicative of a "recapitalization"
(as opposed to a stock dividend) ); Alan 0. Hickok, 32 T.C. 80 (1959), not acquiesced
in, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 8. In Hickok, the corporation, in order to eliminate "dissident
minority groups," embarked upon the following plan: Some of the minority stock was
purchased by the majority group. Additional minority stock was purchased by the cor-
poration for cash, and the balance was acquired by the corporation in exchange for 20-
year, 6 percent debentures. The stock that had been purchased by the majority group
was also acquired by the corporation in exchange for debentures. The Commissioner
argued that there was no "continuity of interest" and hence no recapitalization-reorgan-
ization within section 112(g) (1) (E) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1,
53 Star. 40 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E)). The court held that
the continuity of interest doctrine is not applicable to a recapitalization, stating:
A recapitalization of a single corporation often contemplates some change in
interest, such as from stockholder to bondholder, and in a sense such a change
might always be called an interruption of continuity. . . . It cannot be that
the term "recapitalization" in the statute includes a requirement of the con-
tinuance of the old interest in proprietary form when recapitalization plans so
often contemplate converting such interest to a nonproprietary form.
32 T.C. at 89-90. The court also said that there is no "requirement that a statutory
reorganization by means of recapitalization must be one that strengthens the financial
structure of the corporation." Id. at 93. But cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford,
325 U.S. 283 (1945), where the Supreme Court stated that a reduction of capital
brought into operation the predecessor of section 369(a) (1) (E).
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tions 302 and 346. This, however, was not true in Mills Estate,
the only court of appeals decision of the three. Of the two sections,
Mills would come closer to falling under section 346 than section
302. Moreover, in Gravois, where the deduction was allowed by
the Eighth Circuit, there was apparently no corporate contraction,
only a non pro rata distribution. Thus, the case today would fall
under section 302 and not section 346.
Nevertheless, there have been indications that the Internal Reve-
nue Service and, to some extent, the courts are willing to allow a
deduction for expenses connected with section 346 transactions and
deny it for expenses of section 302 transactions. In Revenue Ruling
67-125,2' the Service considered whether legal fees for tax advice
regarding: "(1) A merger, (2) a stock split, and (3) a proposed
distribution in redemption of outstanding stock under section 302
of the Code (which distribution would not qualify as a partial liqui-
dation under section 346 of the Code)" could be deducted under
section 162. Citing, inter alia, Mills Estate and Standard Linen,
the Service ruled that all of the fees represented capital expendi-
tures.50 The implication of the parenthetical language, however, is
that expenses of section 346 transactions might be treated otherwise.
Two recent cases in this line of decisions tend to support this view.
In United States v. General Bancshares Corp.,5 the taxpayer was a
holding company governed by the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956.52 Pursuant to the requirements of that statute, the taxpayer
sought to divest itself of its nonbanking assets by transferring them
to a newly formed corporation in exchange for that corporation's
stock, and then spinning off the stock pro rata to its shareholders.
No stock was redeemed, although new shares evidencing a change in
the taxpayer's name were issued in exchange for the old shares.
The taxpayer incurred expenses related to documentary stamps, ac-
counting services, printing costs of the new shares, transfer agent
fees, and transfer taxes.
The district court, citing Gravois, held that the dominant aspect
of the plan (excluding the change in corporate name) was liquida-
49 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 31.
50 ld. at 32. The Service also ruled that if the stock redemption plan were aban-
doned, the capitalized legal fees attributable thereto could be deducted in the year of
abandonment. Id. With regard to expenses of abandoned plans of stock offering,
reorganization, etc., see Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1083.
51388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968), afg 258 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
52 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1970).
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tion and not reorganization.5 3  The court, therefore, allowed the
deduction of all expenses except those relating to the name change.
On appeal, the government argued that the plan did not meet the
definition of a partial liquidation in section 346. Indeed, the gov-
ernment maintained, the taxpayer's plan substantially complied with
the definition of a "D" reorganization in section 368(a) (1) (D).
Alternatively, the government argued that if the transaction were
viewed as a partial liquidation, its dominant aspect would be reor-
ganization.M
The court of appeals found that since section 346 is primarily
concerned with the effect of the transaction on shareholders and not
the corporation, it was of little value in determining the character
of expenses incurred by the corporation.55 However, the court also
said:
[T]he effect of the plan of divestment on the business operations
of the taxpayer was the same as if its non-banking stocks were dis-
tributed via a cash dividend, a dividend in kind, a § 346 partial
liquidation, or a distribution qualifying under §§ 1101-1103.
Taxpayer suffered a contraction of corporate assets, having only
assets in the banking field after the plan of divestment.56
The court then held that the taxpayer was entitled to use the domi-
nant aspect test of Gravois and that the dominant aspect of the
distribution by the taxpayer was partial liquidation. Therefore,
except for the expenses relating to the change in corporate name,
the deduction was allowed.57
The court's reference to contraction and the analogy drawn
between the transaction in General Bancshares and a section 346
distribution seem to imply that a transaction that qualifies under
section 346 would give rise to a deduction for the expenses involved.
At least this would appear to be the case where, as in General
Bancshares, the distribution is pro rata and thus contains none of
the elements of a section 302 redemption.
5 258 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
54 388 F.2d at 189.
55 Id. at 190. It should be noted that Judge Blackmun, who wrote the opinion in
Gravois, was on the panel in General Bancshares.
56 Id.
5 7 Compare Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 460 (3d
Cir. 1945), where the corporate taxpayer incurred expenses in distributing warrants to
its shareholders to subscribe to stock of a corporation in which the taxpayer held a sub-
stantial minority interest. The warrants had been received by the taxpayer upon a re-
capitalization of the "subsidiary" corporation. The court denied the deduction on the
ground that recapitalization expenses are not deductible, stating that if the "subsidiary"
had distributed the warrants, it could not have deducted the expense, and that the tax-
payer was in no better position.
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The court in General Bancshares did not deal with the problem
created by the fact that the transaction in Gravois itself did not
involve any corporate contraction, and would not have qualified
under section 346. Indeed, the court at one point said:
Thus, while Gravois... did involve a stock redemption plan meet-
ing the formal requirements of a partial liquidation, the dominant
aspect approach in characterizing expenditures incident to a distri-
bution or liquidation of corporate assets vis-a-vis a concomitant
corporate reorganization appears valid. This doctrine is not lim-
ited only to those expenditures incident to a distribution meeting
the requirements of a § 346 partial liquidation. 58
Prior to the Eighth Circuit opinion in General Bancshares, a
district court, in Transamerica Corp. v. United States,"9 held deduct-
ible the expenses of a transaction essentially identical to that in
General Bancshares. The court reasoned that the plan did not
involve the creation of any tangible or intangible asset for the
benefit of the corporation, and that, even assuming some change in
the corporate structure had taken place, the "dominant purpose"
of the liquidation was the distribution of assets (citing Gravois).o5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopting the reasoning of
the district court and citing as further reinforcement of its views
the Eighth Circuit opinion in General Bancshares."'
In summary, the earlier partial liquidation decisionsea seemed
to base the deductibility of stock redemption expenses on whether
the "dominant aspect"' of the transaction was partial liquidation
or recapitalization. "4 These early cases were all decided under the
58 388 FId at 190-91.
59 254 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cit. 1968).
6Id. at 512-13.
61 United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 523 (9th Cit. 1968).
62 Gravois Planing Mill Co., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 711 (1960), rev'd, 299 F.2d
199 (8th Cit. 1962); Farmers Union Corp., 29 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 1039 (1960), aff'd,
300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962); Standard Linen Service,
Inc., 33 T.C. 1 (1959); Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cit. 1953).
6 3 As noted previously, some of the earlier cases employed a more restrictive test
than "dominant aspect." See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra. The "dominant
aspect" language first appeared in Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d
199 (8th Cir. 1962), where it was used to characterize the earlier decisions. This
characterization appears to have become generally accepted.
There were also two cases in the Tax Court which allowed the taxpayer to deduct
half of the expenses. Mills Estate, Inc., 17 T.C. 910 (1951), and Tobacco Prods. Ex-
port Corp., 18 T.C. 1100 (1952), modified on other grounds, 21 T.C. 625 (1954),
not acquiesced in, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 11, appeal dismissed per stipulation, 4 P-H
FED. TAxES 5 71,121 (2d Cir. 1955). Mills was reversed by the Second Circuit, Mills
Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), and Tobacco Products was
not followed thereafter. See notes 14-30 supra & accompany text.
64 The word "recapitalization" was first introduced in Gravois Planing Mill Co.,
29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 711, 717 (1960), rev'd, 299 F.2d 199, 208 (8th Cir. 1962),
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1939 Code in which every redemption was a partial liquidation.
Except for the Eighth Circuit decision in Gravois, the courts in these
early cases seemed to place substantial emphasis on the formalities
associated with carrying out the transaction. Apparently the formal
reduction of stated capital was of special importance, and because
of this emphasis, the dominant aspect of the transaction was in each
case determined to be recapitalization.
In the cases arising under the 1954 Code, the authorities,65
though applying the same test as before, seemed to place more
emphasis on the substance of the transaction. Of specific impor-
tance was whether the transaction resembled a section 346 contrac-
tion as opposed to a section 302 redemption. The apparent ten-
dency was to allow a deduction for expenses of a section 346 trans-
action and to deny it for expenses of a section 302 type transaction.
B. The Simple Acquisition Cases
Alongside the partial liquidation line of decisions, a totally sepa-
rate body of law has developed that treats the expenses incurred by
a corporation in redeeming its own stock as expenses incurred in
the simple acquisition of a capital asset. These cases apply the
general rule that such expenses are to be capitalized as part of the
cost of acquisition. Strangely, none of the cases in this line cite
any of the partial liquidation cases, or even so much as mention
partial liquidation, recapitalization, or reorganization.66 Moreover,
none of the partial liquidation cases cite any of the simple acquisi-
tion cases.
The earliest authority in this line is Office Decision 852,67 where
the Service ruled that expenses incurred by a corporation in pur-
chasing its own stock "for the purpose of retirement or holding as
where it was used by the Tax Court and adopted by the Eighth Circuit. The other cases
referred variously to "reorganization," e.g., Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206
F.2d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1953), or a "change in the corporate structure for the benefit
of future operations," e.g., Farmers Union Corp., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1039, 1054
(1960), aff'd, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962). How-
ever, the term "recapitalization" appears to accurately reflect what was meant. See
Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942), defining "recapitali-
zation" as a "reshuffling of a capital structure, within the framework of an existing
corporation." See note 48 supra.
65 Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 31; United States v. General Bancshares
Corp., 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d
522 (9th Cit. 1968).
66 Indeed, few of the cases in the simple acquisition "line" cite anything, not even
earlier cases in the same line. And none of them cite Office Decision 852, 4 CuM.
BULL. 286 (1921), which was the first authority to stand for the proposition.
674 CUM. BULL. 286 (1921).
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treasury stock" were "to be considered part of the purchase price
of the stock." To the same effect, Southern Engineering & Metal
Products Corp. 8 denied a deduction for legal and accounting fees
connected with the redemption of the stock of a 50-percent share-
holder. The court stated simply that the fees "should have been
treated as a capital expenditure, i.e., as part of the cost of the
stock."'6 9
It should be noted that in several of the simple acquisition
cases the taxpayers contended that the redemption was necessary
in order to settle inter-shareholder strife. Moreover, in some cases
there was evidence that, but for the redemption, damage would
have been done to the corporation itself. For example, in Commerce
Photo Print Corp.,7 the taxpayer contended that the primary pur-
pose of the redemption of the stock held by its secretary-treasurer
was to prevent him from further implementing price-cutting policies
which were causing losses to the corporation.7 Indeed, the court
specifically found that a recent loss sustained by the corporation
was due in part to these policies.7' Yet the court held that the
majority shareholder's desire to eliminate the secretary-treasurer
from the business was immaterial. The court then said the "fee
which was paid in connection with petitioner's acquisition of 49
percent of its own shares in exchange for the stock of its subsidiary
corporation was an expenditure for the acquisition of property; and,
therefore, a capital expenditure rather than a business expense.""3
Similarly, in Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc.,.4 there were
three equal shareholders, Walter and William Von Atzingen and
Henry Zima. Friction arose between the Von Atzingens and Zima,
and it was decided that the corporation should redeem the shares
held by the Von Atzingens. The Tax Court denied the corporation
a deduction for the $6,000 legal fee incurred in connection with the
transaction. Judge Raum said:
That payment is a capital expenditure which should have been
treated as part of the cost of the stock purchased. It is not de-
ductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The fact
that the purchase of the stock was motivated by a desire to elim-
68 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 81 (1950).
69 Id. at 84.
70 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1947), appeal dismissed, 3 P-H FED. TAX SERVIcE
CITATOR 5712 (2d Cir. 1947).
71 Id. at 339.
72 Id. at 338.
73 Id. at 340.
74 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
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inate friction between the Von Atzingens and Zima is immaterial.
Certainly, the cost of the stock itself was a capital expenditure
rather than a deductible expense, and the accompanying legal fee
must similarly be classified.75
Commerce Photo Print was not cited, nor were any other authori-
ties.
Annabelle Candy Co.7 was decided after Atzingen and involved
similar facts. After difficulties had arisen between the corporation's
two 50-percent shareholders, the corporation bought out the interest
of one of them. The corporation argued that a portion of the at-
torney's services was devoted to avoidance of dissolution and to
devising alternative plans discussed prior to the adoption of the
redemption agreement. The court held that the entire expenditure
was related to the agreement to purchase the stock and should be
treated as part of its cost 17  However, the court went on to say
that, had the petitioner proved that other services (i.e., avoiding
dissolution) were actually rendered, an allocation of the total legal
fee between the deductible and nondeductible portions might have
been possible. 8
It is difficult to understand why the partial liquidation and the
simple acquisition lines of authority developed as they did. 9 In
75Id. at 183.
76 30 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 953 (1961), remanded on other grounds, 314 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1962).
77 Id. at 957.
78 ld.
79 Perhaps something can be learned from the chronology of the decisions set forth
in Appendix A infra. Since Commerce Photo-Print and Southern Engineering, both
simple acquisition cases, were decided prior to any of the partial liquidation cases, it is
not surprising that they did not mention partial liquidation. However, the subsequent
six decisions were all partial liquidation cases, and the failure of the courts in those cases
to cite Commerce Photo-Print and Southern Engineering is less understandable. Indeed,
the transaction in Standard Linen (non pro rata distribution of the assets of a former
subsidiary operating a related business) bears striking resemblance to the transaction in
Commerce Photo-Print (non pro rata distribution of the stock of a subsidiary itself,
also operating a related business). Further, the transaction in Gravois was similar
to that in Southern Engineering (non pro rata distribution of cash). The next two
cases, Atzingeo and Annabelle Candy, were simple acquisition cases, but their failure
to cite the previous partial liquidation cases might be explained on the ground that
Atzingen and Annabelle Candy were both decided under the 1954 Code in which a
simple cash redemption with no corporate contraction (the type of transaction involved
in both cases) was no longer described as a partial liquidation. The rest of the cases
were all partial liquidation cases, and again it is hard to understand why these courts
did not cite any of the simple acquisition cases. This is especially true with respect
to the court of appeals decision in Gravois, where the transaction was similar to that in
Atzingen. Thus, on balance, it appears that the failure of the simple acquisition cases
to cite the partial liquidation cases is more understandable than the failure of the par-
tial liquidation cases to cite the simple acquisition cases.
The only explanation that comes to mind for the failure of the partial liquidation
cases to cite the simple acquisition cases is that in all of the partial liquidation cases
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any event, it should be noted that, as in the early partial liquidation
rulings, both Commerce Photo Print and Southern Engineering were
decided under the 1939 Code.8° Under that Act it was possible for
a corporation to recognize gain or loss upon the resale of its treasury
stock, that is, when it dealt in its own shares as it might in the
shares of another corporation.8' Thus, it is perhaps not too sur-
prising that the early simple acquisition cases held that the expenses
of purchase were to be added to the cost of the shares, under the
general rule that expenses of purchase of a capital asset are to be
added to the basis of the asset. In fact, the court in Commerce
Photo Print noted that the corporation had entered the repurchased
shares on its books as treasury stock82 and was holding them for
subsequent sale to its officers. Such a resale to employees, used as an
incentive device, was viewed by some courts as the type of transac-
tion in which the corporation was dealing in its own shares just as
it might in the shares of another corporation.t 3
The 1954 Code, however, provides in section 1032: "No gain
or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money
or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock)
of such corporation." And the regulations under this section state
that it applies even though the corporation deals in its own shares
as it might in the shares of another corporation. 4 Thus, after
1954, a corporation's basis in its own repurchased shares is irrele-
vant. Adding the cost of the redemption transaction to the basis
of the stock might then seem unfair, since this would mean that
such costs would never be deductible.8 5 Further, section 1032
appears to recognize that a corporation's own repurchased stock is
not an asset to the corporation any more than its own authorized
(nor counting General Bancshares and Transamerica, where there was no actual stock
redemption) there was a formal reduction of capital, while this does not appear to have
been the case in any of the simple acquisition cases. This factor may be what touched
off the inquiry into the "dominant aspect" of the transaction (recapitalization or partial
liquidation). If this is so, it is strange that a factor cutting in favor of classifying
the transaction as a recapitalization under the dominant aspect test, and therefore re-
quiring capitalization of the redemption expenses, should be the very thing that gave
rise to the application of that test in the first instance and thus supplied the taxpayer
with at least an opportunity for deductibility.
8 0 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 1.
8 1 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-15(b) (1953). On the other hand the original is-
suance of shares resulted in no taxable income. Id.
8216 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 339.
83 See BITrKx & EUSTICE g 3.13. Other courts construed the regulation more
narrowly. Id.
8 4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(a) (1956).
85 See D. Hmwrmz, supra note 8, at 545.
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but unissued shares. 8" Consequently, there is a significant conceptual
problem in requiring that the redemption expenses be treated as
part of the cost of an "asset" acquired. It might have been expected,
therefore, that, after the 1954 Code was adopted, the courts in the
simple acquisition cases would have taken into account the lack-
of-asset-lack-of-basis problem in deciding whether to require capital-
ization of redemption expenses. However, two of the simple acqui-
sition cases discussed above, Atzingen and Annabelle Candy, were
decided under the 1954 Code and no mention was made of section
1032 or the ultimate nondeductibility of the expenses.
Interestingly, there has been one case in which this factor was
considered sufficiently important to allow the taxpayer to deduct
the expense. In T. lack Foster,8 two affiliated corporations paid
legal fees in the process of obtaining FHA approval to redeem
their Class A stock, which was held by a single parent corporation.
In allowing the deduction the Tax Court emphasized the fact that
the redeemed stock was cancelled and therefore "no 'treasury stock'
[was] acquired by the corporation to add this expense to as a
basis." 8 The court concluded:
We agree with respondent that the item is of the nature of
selling expenses in connection with the sale of stock. Ordinarily,
this would be considered as increasing the amount paid for the
stock and would become a part of the cost and basis of an asset ac-
quired. In the instant case, Ord and Monterey [the two affiliated
corporations] redeemed their stock and so had no asset, the basis
of which could be increased. Under these circumstances the
amount is in the nature of an amount expended in an effort to ac-
quire a capital asset which results in a failure to acquire the asset.
On this analogy we conclude that petitioners are entitled to deduct
the $2,700 payment.89
It should be noted that this "basis irrelevancy" argument, is not
without its difficulties. For example, conceptually, if the expenses
86 Today, of course, it is almost universally recognized that stock should not be
viewed as an asset in the hands of the issuer. Once reacquired such "treasury"
stock is no different from authorized but unissued stock, which has never been
accorded asset status. And insofar as creditors are concerned, they usually be-
come worried about the makeup of the assets of a corporation as a source for
payment of their claims only when they are not being paid in ordinary course,
and at such times treasury stock is almost certain to be worthless.
Herwitz, supra note 5, at 305-06.
8735 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1556 (1966), modified on other grounds, 36 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1120 (1967), modified and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Likins-
Foster Honolulu Corp. v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 987 (1970).
881d. at 1589.
89Id.
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of redeeming the stock are thought of as part of the cost of the
shares, they should be no more deductible than the actual redemp-
tion payment itself. In other words, the rationale of the 1954 Code
simple acquisition cases (Atzingen and Annabelle Candy) may not
be that the expenses are connected with the acquisition of an asset,
but rather that the expenses are connected with the distribution in
exchange for the stock, and that they therefore increase that distri-
bution. In this regard, it should be noted that of all the simple
acquisition cases only in Commerce Photo Print, a 1939 Code case,
is there any specific asset acquisition language. And, as mentioned
previously, in that case the stock acquired might have had some asset
significance to the corporation.90 The other simple acquisition cases,
including Atzingen and Annabelle Candy, all speak of the expenses
as being simply part of the "cost" of the stock. Perhaps the word
"cost" in this context is a reference to asset distribution rather than
asset acquisition.
In Foster the government apparently attempted an argument
along these lines when it urged that the item in question was in the
"nature of selling expenses in connection with the sale of stock."
Such stock issuance expenses are regarded as merely reducing the
net proceeds received by the corporation for its stock.9' They are
therefore not deductible either currently or as a section 165 loss
upon dissolution of the enterprise. 2  Arguably, by analogy, stock
redemption expenses should be regarded as increasing the amount
of the distribution and should also not be deductible.
The difficulty with this analysis is that if stock redemption ex-
penses are thought of as connected with the distribution of assets,
there are closer analogies to be drawn than the one to stock issuance
expenses. Thus, it appears that expenses of a simple cash or
property dividend are deductible.93 If this is so, then expenses of
90 See note 83 supra & accompanying text.
9 1 BITiR & EusTIc 5 5.04.
92 Id. But see Weissman, supra note 8, at 718 and cases discussed therein. Ex-
penses of stock issuance, such as commissions, professional fees and printing costs, are
not amortizable under section 248 either. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (3) (i) (1956).
Interestingly, the expenses of drafting the terms of original stock certificates are amor-
tizable under section 248. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (2) (1956). But this, of course,
is pursuant to specific statutory authority, without which no deduction would be al-
lowed. See BInIKBR & EusncE 5 5.07.
9 3 See text accompanying note 56 supra, where the court in United States v. General
Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968), implies that such expenses would be
deductible.
See Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 504, 511 (N.D. Cal. 1966),
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a distribution in exchange for stock should also be deductible.
Given this analogy, it may be assumed that it is only the presence
of the stock that differentiates the simple acquisition cases (including
Atzingen and Annabelle Candy) and leads to a denial of the
deduction. This in turn indicates that the rationale of all of these
cases is asset acquisition after all, which is further supported by the
fact that the word "cost" generally connotes asset acquisition rather
than asset distribution.
The fact remains, however, that, at least under the 1954 Code, a
corporation's repurchased stock is no more an asset to the corporation
than its own authorized but unissued shares.94 Certainly, the courts
in the 1954 Code simple acquisition cases were aware of that fact.
To be sure the expenses connected with creating authorized but
unissued shares would not be deductible but for section 248. But
this is because they are organization expenses, not because they are
expenses of acquiring a capital asset.
Perhaps this latter fact may yield a clue as to the rationale of
the 1954 Code simple acquisition cases. In every simple acquisition
case95 (including the 1954 Code cases) there was a non pro rata
distribution. In other words, there was a shifting of the interest
of the shareholders. Thus, perhaps the courts, at least in the 1954
Code simple acquisition cases, detected elements of recapitalization
in the transactions before them, and disallowed the expenses on
that basis. If so the later simple acquisition cases are consistent
with the more recent partial liquidation authorities which seemed
to favor deductibility for expenses of a section 346 transaction, but
to deny it for expenses of a section 302 redemption96 Indeed, even
T. lack Foster might be explained along these lines, for in that case
the redeemed stock was held by the parent of the taxpayer corpora-
tions, and the parent continued to own the remainder of the
subsidiaries' stock after the redemption. Thus, in Foster, while
there was no corporate contraction, there was at least no shifting of
the interest of any of the shareholders. In short, the recent simple
a/I'd, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968), where the deductibility of cash or property divi-
dend expenses is assumed without discussion. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-615, 1969-2 CUM.
BULL. 26 (fees paid to registrar and transfer agent for maintenance of stock records,
not related to an original issue of stock, merger, consolidation or stock dividends are
ordinary and necessary business expenses).
94 See note 86 supra.
95 As used in the text the category "simple acquisition cases" does not include T.
Jack Foster, where the deduction was allowed. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
96 See note 65 supra & accompanying text,
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acquisition cases may, at least on a factual basis, be reconciled with
the recent partial liquidation authorities.9 7
C. The Business Purpose Cases
Surprisingly, there is yet a third set of cases dealing with
stock redemption expenses. Under these cases, the expenses incurred
by a corporation in redeeming its own stock are deductible if the
redemption was necessary to achieve a legitimate corporate business
purpose, such as avoiding liquidation. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
has gone so far as to hold that, in such circumstances, the purchase
price of the stock itself is deductible.
In Five Star Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,"' the corpora-
tion, owned in equal parts by Smith and Kincade, was the assignee
of a patent licensing agreement. When the corporation stopped
paying royalties, the owner of the patent, Freeman, sued and re-
covered a money judgement as well as cancellation of the licensing
agreement. Freeman then entered into a new licensing agreement
with Kincade. -Freeman was unwilling to have Smith take part in
the transaction since Smith's heavy drawings from the corporation
apparently had been the cause of the original breakdown in the flow
of royalties. Thereafter, the corporation sued Smith to recover
the draws. Smith countered with a suit to have the corporation
9 7 An interesting recent development in the simple acquisition line of authority
lies in the supersedure of Office Decision 852, 4 CuM. BULL. 286 (1921), by Rev. Rul.
69-561, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 25. As mentioned above, in O.D. 852 the Service ruled
that "expenses" of stock repurchase were to be considered part of the purchase price of
the stock. However, in Revenue Ruling 69-561, the Service stated merely that "brok-
erage fees" incurred by a corporation in purchasing its own stock are "part of the pur-
chase price of the stock so acquired."
The Service's reference to "brokerage fees" as opposed to "expenses" may indicate
some retreat from its original position. Brokerage fees are usually incurred only where
the shares of a publicly held corporation are purchased in the open market. This type
of transaction usually does not involve the type of expenses with which most of the
simple acquisition cases have been concerned, i.e., legal and accounting fees incurred
by a closely held corporation in redeeming its stock. Thus, perhaps, the Service is
restricting the simple acquisition rule to routine trading by a publicly held corporation
in its own shares.
On the other hand, the revenue ruling cites Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36
T.C. 173 (1961), to support its position, and that simple acquisition case involved the
purchase by a closely held corporation of the stock held by two of its three equal
shareholders. The expenses were legal and accounting fees, not brokerage fees. Further-
more, the reference to brokerage fees in the revenue ruling may be merely an attempt
to bring the ruling in line with the regulations under section 263, which, in dealing
with the general question of expenses to be added to the cost of securities, refer only to
"commissions." Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e) (1958).
98 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966), revg 40 T.C. 379 (1963).
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placed in receivership. The court refused to grant receivership and
awarded the corporation a judgment against Smith. The court also
ordered public sale of Smith's stock to satisfy the judgment. The
corporation was the only bidder, and, after some controversy over
the price, the sale was ultimately confirmed. The corporation at-
tempted to deduct the purchase price of the stock.
The Tax Court99 held that the payment was not deductible since
"any benefit resulting from the purchase of the stock would extend
over an indefinite number of years."' °  However, the court of ap-
peals reversed.' Judge Jones reasoned:
At the time of the judicial sale of the Smith stock, two-thirds
of the Finished Goods Inventory was under the attachment made
at the behest of Freeman. The license to manufacture and sell
under the Freeman patent had been cancelled. Five Star had
neither the right to sell nor goods which could have been sold. It
had no working capital and no credit. It had obligations which
could not have been paid from the assets upon liquidation which
would have been inevitable if Smith had not been removed from
the scene. As intimated by the district court, the future of the
company, at the time of the sale, depended upon Kincade, his
credit, his know-how, energy and business ability. It also de-
pended upon Freeman's willingness to allow Five Star to continue
in business under Kincade's management and backing but only if
Smith was out of the picture. Had Smith remained as the owner
of fifty percent of the stock of Five Star, its liquidation was inevi-
table, and in the event of its liquidation there could have been no
realization for stockholders. With the removal of Smith, with the
management and credit of Kincade, and with the cooperation of
Freeman, there was a chance for survival.
• ..It can scarcely be held that the payment to Smith was for
the acquisition of a capital asset, but rather one which would per-
mit Five Star again to use assets for income production by freeing
its management from unwarranted fetters.' 0 2
The court then upheld the deduction, citing cases holding that the
purchase of stock by a taxpayer to assure a supply of goods could
give rise to a deductible loss.1 3
99 40 T.C. 379 (1963).
100 Id at 391.
101 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
102 Id. at 727.
103 Id. See also Williams & Waddell, Inc. v. Pitts, 148 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.S.C.
1957). There the taxpayer was an insurance agency. One of its two equal share-
holders died and his widow inherited his stock. The companies for which the cor-
poration acted as agent refused to accept the widow's designate as a substitute for her
deceased husband. To induce her to sell her shares to someone acceptable to the com-
panies, the corporation promised to pay her $100 per month for life, the amount to
be increased depending on the earnings of the corporation. These payments by the
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General Pencil Co.,"04 a business purpose case decided several
years before Five Star, did not go quite as far; it held that the busi-
ness purpose of a redemption justified the deductibility of the ex-
penses connected with the transaction. 15 In General Pencil, one-
third of the corporation's stock was owned by Raymond Weissen-
born. His brother, Oscar, and a brother-in-law owned the other two-
thirds. The corporation was losing money, and the board of direc-
tors advised Raymond, the company's president, "of the functions he
should perform and how he should carry on his work."'" 6 Raymond
promptly resigned. Thereafter he threatened the corporation with
suit for receivership. Several of the corporation's salesmen resigned
because of the internal situation, and some of the corporation's best
customers expressed concern. The corporation then employed legal
counsel and negotiations with Raymond went on for several months,
but no settlement was reached. The corporation then employed new
counsel who, after further negotiations, advised the company that
"the only way open to a satisfactory settlement with Raymond was
for [the corporationj to buy his stock in the company." The corpo-
ration then "reluctantly made the purchase."' 17
In upholding the deduction for the $1,700 of legal expenses
involved, the court said:
It was necessary to employ counsel to protect petitioner's business
interests against the threat of a possible receivership, and to cope
with the other disrupting forces let loose by Raymond Weissenborn
which had brought about the temporary resignation of certain key
salesmen and brought from customers inquiries as to what was
taking place in the affairs of the petitioner. The fact that the dis-
pute was finally settled by the purchase by petitioner of the shares
held in it by Raymond Weissenborn does not establish that the at-
torneys' fees were paid as an incident to the acquisition of such
shares. Nor do we think the fees can be said to constitute "the
cost of defending or perfecting title to property," within the mean-
ing of the Commissioner's Regulations.10 8
corporation were held to be deductible. The court found that the fair value of the
stock did not exceed the price paid for it by the new party exclusive of the corpora-
tion's payments. Therefore, the payments to the widow were "not a part of the sale
transaction," but were expended "to prevent the very real danger of cancellation of
agency contracts indispensable to [the corporation's) existence." Id. at 781.
104 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 689 (1944).
105 Apparently, the taxpayer did not contend that the purchase price itself was de-
ductible.
106 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 689.
107 Id.
108sId. The regulation referred to was Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.24-2 (1942).
See also William C. Atwater & Co., 10 T.C. 218 (1948), acquiesced in, 1948-1
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Notwithstanding the contrary protestations of the court, it seems
clear that at least part of the expenses in General Pencil were in-
curred in fixing the terms of the purchase agreement. Thus, the
case seems factually similar to Annabelle Candy in the simple ac-
quisition line. There the taxpayer urged that a portion of the at-
torney's services was devoted to avoidance of dissolution, and to
devising alternative plans discussed prior to the adoption of the re-
demption plan. And, while the court in Annabelle Candy expressed
some willingness to allocate the fee in question, it implied that
under no circumstances would the portion attributable to the re-
demption itself be deductible." 9
Again, neither of the two business purpose cases discussed above
cited any of the partial liquidation or simple acquisition cases. Nor
did any cases in those lines of authority mention the business pur-
pose cases. 110
Although the business purpose cases number the fewest of the
three lines of authority; there is much to be said for the approach
they adopt. Except for the later partial liquidation cases, only in
the business purpose line'is any express attention paid to the sub-
stance of the transaction as opposed to the formalities of carrying
it out. Thus, as noted previously, the early partial liquidation cases
(except Gravois) seemed to stress the factor of stated capital re-
duction as indicative of recapitalization."- Reduction of capital
seems to be a rather perfunctory act and a meaningless touchstone
for capitalization. Indeed in Mills Estate, the earliest case in the
partial liquidation line, reduction of capital was required by state
statute." 2 In the simple acquisition cases, while the courts may have
CUM. BULL. 1, where the corporate taxpayer was allowed to deduct expenses of defend-
ing a suit by a former employee in which the employee sought to enforce his right
to have the corporation repurchase his shares under the corporation's employee stock
plan. The court also allowed the taxpayer to deduct the difference between the judg-
ment awarded against it in the suit and the fair market value of the shares it was forced
to repurchase as a result thereof. (The contract with the employee called for the stock
to be repurchased at "book value" and it was on this basis that judgment was awarded
against the taxpayer. However, the Tax Court determined that the fair market value
of the stock was considerably less than its book value.) The court said that this dif-
ference was additional compensation paid to the former employee. Id. at 247.
109 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
110 General Pencil Co., 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mein. 689 (1944), was decided before any
of the simple acquisition or partial liquidation authorities except Office Decision 852, 4
CUM. BULL. 286 (1921) (simple acquisition). Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966), was decided after several partial liquidation and simple
acquisition cases.
i"'.See notes 62-65 supra & accompanying text.
112 See note 15 supra.
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been considering factors other than whether a "capital asset" was
involved, this could hardly be determined from the language used.
And, except for Foster, no express attention was paid to the fact
that treasury stock has no real asset significance for a corporation,
at least not under the 1954 Code.
To be sure, a business purpose approach is not without its
difficulties, the principal one being whether the business purpose
involved is capital or noncapital in nature. Thus, in Five Star the
Tax Court and the court of appeals differed on the question of
whether the stock purchase was of long-term benefit to the corpora-
tion."' This was probably due to the fact that there were a number
of business purposes involved in Five Star: there was the simple
desire to avoid liquidation, the desire to protect the licensing agree-
ment, and, finally, the desire to eliminate shareholder friction over
matters of corporate policy.
Nonetheless, when the question arises of whether a business
purpose is capital or noncapital in nature, the courts are not with-
out analogies upon which they can draw. For example, avoiding
liquidation in a nonredemption context has been held to give rise
to a deduction for the expenses involved." 4 And, as noted in the
court of appeals decision in Five Star, the purchase of another
corporation's stock for the purpose of obtaining a source of supply
has been held to give rise to an ordinary loss deduction." 5
Perhaps most appropriate in connection with redemption situ-
ations is the analogy to proxy-fight expenses. It seems fairly well
established that reimbursements to shareholders for proxy-fight
expenditures are deductible by the corporation, provided that "such
expenditures were primarily concerned with a question of corporate
policy.""'  In the context of a closely held corporation, contests
113 See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra.
114 See Western Grain Co. v. Patterson, 59-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 73,466 (N.D. Ala.
1959).
15 E.g., Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640 (5th Cit. 1954); see Rev. Rul. 58-40,
1958-1 CuM. BULL. 275.
1 16 Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 28; Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237
F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964); Central Foundry Co., 49 T.C. 234 (1967) (opinion
by Raum, J.) (reimbursement of successful insurgents held deductible), acquiesced in,
1968-2 CuM. BULL. 2. Judge Raum also wrote the opinions in Mills Estate, Inc., 17
T.C. 910 (1951), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cit. 1953) (partial
liquidation); Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961) (simple acquisi-
tion); and Annabelle Candy Co., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 953 (1961), remanded on
other grounds, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cit. 1962) (simple acquisition).
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over corporate policy can often be settled only by share redemption.
This may be true in some cases of publicly held corporations as
well. It seems inconsistent to allow deductibility for expenses of
one method of resolving questions of corporate policy while denying
deductibility for expenses of another method. 117
Of course, not all of the analogies will tend toward deductibility
for stock redemption expenses. Thus, in Five Star there was protec-
tion of a licensing agreement as a result of the stock repurchase.
It has been held that payments to protect a franchise are not de-
ductible,'18 and the same is generally true of other payments in-
volved in the elimination of competition." 9
Perhaps, where, as in Five Star, there are several purposes, some
capital and others noncapital, it would not be inappropriate to make
some sort of allocation of the expenses. Further, some of the
expenditures might be allocable to, or create, a capital asset of limi-
ted duration, thus, giving rise to later deductions for amortization.
Finally, some observations are in order as to the relationship of
the business purpose cases to the other two lines of authority. First,
it should be noted that both of the business purpose cases involved
non pro rata redemptions and do not fit under the rubric previously
suggested for reconciling the recent simple acquisition and partial
liquidation cases.' Nonetheless, it may be significant that in the
business purpose cases, the business purpose involved was of major
proportions, while, in most of the simple acquisition cases in which
a business purpose was suggested, that purpose appeared to be of
lesser importance. The only exception in the simple acquisition
line was Commerce Photo Print, where there was a specific -finding
that the shareholder whose stock had been redeemed was causing
losses to the corporation. There, however, the stock was held for
resale to employees and, under the 1939 Code, might have had
some asset significance to the corporation. 2' In other words, the
asset significance of the stock might have been a factor which over-
shadowed the strong business purpose in Commerce Photo Print.
In the other simple acquisition cases either there was a failure to
117 Moreover, where it can be shown that a particular shareholder has actually
caused losses to the corporation, the corporation's case should be stronger still.
118 See Eagle Pass & Piedras Negras Bridge Co., 23 B.T.A. 1338 (1931).
119 See 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxAToN § 25.37 (rev. ed.
1972).
120 See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
12 1 See notes 82-83 supra & accompanying text.
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show any business purpose or the business purpose was of lesser
significance than that involved in the business purpose cases. Thus,
in Atzingen and Annabelle Candy, the two 1954 Code simple
acquisition cases, there was only the suggestion of shareholder fric-
tion, but these cases did not involve compelling factual situations
such as those in Five Star and General Pencil.
Perhaps, then, the business purpose cases may be reconciled with
at least the more recent simple acquisition cases on the theory that
presumptively a section 302 redemption does not give rise to a de-
duction for the expense involved, but where a showing of a strong
noncapital business purpose is made, the presumption is overcome.
III. APPRAISAL EXPENSES -
THE Woodward AND Hilton DECISIONS
A. The Background
Most corporate statutes provide that when a shareholder dissents
from some major corporate action, he is entitled to have his shares
appraised and to receive the fair market value of those shares.122
From a tax standpoint such appraisal proceedings may be viewed in
several ways:
1. First, the appraisal proceedings may be pursuant to a statu-
tory merger or consolidation, with one corporation substantially
larger than the other, and with the dissenters holding stock in the
smaller corporation. Under most corporate statutes appraisal is re-
ferred to as "the payment for... shares."' 23 Moreover, it is usually
the surviving or new corporation which bears the liability. 24 There-
fore, under the facts set forth above, it is possible to characterize
the appraisal proceedings as the purchase by the larger corporation
of the stock held by some of the shareholders of the smaller corpo-
ration.
2. On the other hand, appraisal rights for dissenting share-
holders arise in the context of a vote by the shareholders of a par-
ticular corporation. 25 This is true whether a merger or other corpo-
rate action (such as a sale of assets) is involved. Thus, it is pos-
122 See, e.g., MBCA § 80.
123 MBCA § 81. See MBCA § 6: "[A] corporation may purchase or otherwise
acquire its own shares for the purpose of: ... (C) Paying dissenting shareholders en-
titled to payment for their shares under the provisions of this Act." (emphasis added).
124 See, e.g., AfBlQA § 81.
12 5 See, e.g., MBCA 88 72-73, 79-80.
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sible to characterize appraisal proceedings as being incident to the
purchase by the dissenters' corporation of its own shares. Under
this view, the fact that in a merger the legal obligation is that of
the surviving corporation might be explained on the ground that
the surviving corporation is responsible for the obligations of its
predecessors by operation of law. 126
3. On a broader level, where a merger or consolidation is in-
volved, it is possible to view appraisal proceedings as being simply
incident to the primary transaction, i.e., the merger or consolidation.
4. Finally, it could be argued that appraisal proceedings are
incident neither to the purchase of shares nor to merger, consolida-
tion, or other corporate action. With regard to the share purchase
aspect of the transaction, it should be noted that under many corpo-
rate statutes most incidents of share ownership cease to exist for
the dissenters upon their demand for appraisal.' Thus, the en-
suing proceedings do not involve title to the shares, only the value
of the shares. Insofar as a merger is concerned, it could be argued
that appraisal does nothing to further the merger. Indeed, the merg-
er proceeds in spite of, rather than because of, the appraisal. In
other words, appraisal, in some sense, is at odds with the "re-
structuring" which is the ongoing attribute of a reorganization.
Viewed in this light, the expenses of appraisal appear incident to
answering the claims of uncooperative owners. Such expenses are,
of course, "occasioned" by the reorganization, but do little to "fur-
ther it."
It should be noted that, of these four views of an appraisal pro-
ceeding, only the last would clearly lead to a deduction for the
expenses involved. Expenses involved in the purchase by one corpo-
ration of the stock of another (#1 above) are generally not de-
ductible under well established principles; 2 ' nor are expenses of
reorganization (#3 above). The determination of the deductibility
of expenses incurred by a corporation in purchasing its own stock
(#2 above) throws one into the maze of case law described earlier.
Thus, only by viewing appraisal proceedings as incident neither to
stock purchase nor to reorganization, can the expenses be character-
ized as noncapital in nature. It is not surprising, therefore, that
126 See, e.g., MBCA § 76(e).
127 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-374(c) (1960); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8,§ 262(i) (1953); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 12:131(H) (1969); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 73(i) (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.54(4) (1963); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.85 (E) (Page 1964).
128 See, e.g., Fireman's Ins. Co., 30 B.T.A. 1004 (1934).
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corporate taxpayers wishing to deduct appraisal litigation expenses
have attempted to paint this picture of appraisal proceedings.
The first such ,attempt was unsuccessful. In Boulder Building
Corp. v. United States," a majority of the corporation's sharehold-
ers voted to extend the then expiring corporate charter and to amend
the powers of the corporation. Under Oklahoma law this action
gave rise to appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders. During
the ensuing appraisal litigation the corporation paid approximately
$28,000 in legal and appraisal fees.
The district court, in holding that the fees had to be capitalized,
said:
[T]he decisions have uniformly held that where professional fees
are paid in connection with the acquisition of stock, or where the
title to stock is defended or perfected, such expense whether for
attorney's fees, or otherwise, cannot be deemed an ordinary business
expense but must be classified as a capital expenditure, an expen-
diture to be taken into consideration in determining capital gain
or loss at the subsequent sale of the involved stock.' 30
The court went on to hold that "[t]he expenditures associated with
the ultimate transfer of approximately one-third of the plaintiff's
corporate stock cannot be deemed an expense arising out of ordinary
business operation but must be considered an expenditure directly
related to the acquisition of capital stock.'' 131
It should be noted that only one corporation was involved in
Boulder Building. Thus, the court could not have considered this
transaction as the purchase by one corporation of the stock of an-
other. Nor could the transaction have been viewed as a reorganiza-
tion, i.e., a merger or consolidation. In view of the nondeductibil-
ity holding, then, the court must have viewed the transaction as the
purchase by a corporation of its own stock. Therefore, the case
could easily be classified as just another simple acquisition case. 32
Like the other simple acquisition cases, no reference was made in
Boulder to any of the partial liquidation or business purpose cases.
However, none of the simple acquisition cases were cited either.
129 125 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
1S0 d. at 515.
131Id. at 516-17. The court did not discuss whether, under Oklahoma law, title
to the stock remained in the dissenting shareholders until the value of the stock had
been determined. However, this appears to have been the case. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1.161 (1951).
132 Since there was a non pro rata distribution, the result in Boulder is consistent
with the rationale suggested for reconciling the simple acquisition cases with the later
partial liquidation cases. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
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The next case of appraisal litigation expenses incurred by a
corporation resulted in success for the taxpayer. In Smith Hotel
Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson,13 two of three shareholders voted in
favor of the sale of substantially all of the corporation's assets.
Under Wisconsin law, such action gave rise to appraisal rights for
the dissenter. In allowing the corporation to deduct the expenses
incurred, the court said:
Counsel for the plaintiff urges that the decision in Boulder is
unsound in that it disregards the fact that the taxpayer's obligation
to purchase the dissenters' stock was an involuntary obligation.
Under the Oklahoma statute, as well as under the Wisconsin stat-
ute, once the dissenters have demanded that the corporation pur-
chase their shares at fair value, the corporation has no choice in
the matter. After the demand has been made, the corporation's
main concern is with keeping its liability to a minimum. Plaintiff's
argument is sound. Viewed in this light it appears that the pri-
mary purpose of the state litigation in the instant case was a de-
termination of the fair value of the shares, and the involvement
of title was incidental. The deduction made by the taxpayer was
proper as an ordinary and necessary business expense.'3
Again, as in Boulder, only one corporation was involved in
Smith. Thus, there was no possibility for the government to argue
that the expenses were reorganization expenses or to argue that they
were incident to the purchase by one corporation of the stock of an-
other. Here, then, it is clear that the fourth view of the transaction
was accepted. 35
It should also be noted that there is at least a surface simi-
larity between the primary purpose test employed by the court in
Smith Hotel and the approach taken by the business purpose cases
1.33236 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
134 Id. at 305-06.
135 See also Vermont Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt.
1969), discussed at note 178 infra. In addition to these cases, stock appraisal expenses
had, prior to the decisions in Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), and
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970), given rise to two cases
dealing with the other side of the coin, namely the deductibility under section 212 of
the expenses of the individual whose stock is appraised. In Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C.
371 (1943), aft'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945), the Tax
Court ruled that the expenses were deductible (rather than simply reducing the net
proceeds of the transaction) on the ground that the expenses "bore a reasonable and
proximate relation to the production or collection of income, and to the management of
property held for that purpose." Id. at 374. Heller was followed on similar facts in
Stempfel v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,081 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), which was
decided after the Tax Court decision in Fred W. Woodward, 49 T.C. 377 (1968),
aff'd, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cit. 1969), af'd, 397 U.S. 572 (1970). After the Supreme
Court decision in Woodward, Stemp/el was reversed by the Sixth Circuit sub nom. Third
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 427 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1970).
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in the stock redemption area. The court in Smith Hotel, however,
concentrated on one specific aspect of the transaction, i.e., the litiga-
tion itself, while the business purpose cases examined the substance
of the transaction as a whole. Indeed, the primary purpose test as
applied by the court in Smith Hotel seems to be a much more for-
malistic approach than that taken by the business purpose cases,
since it is only by virtue of the operation of the state statute that the
"primary purpose" was held to be non-capital.
B. The Woodward and Hilton Decisions
It was against this background that the Supreme Court decided
the companion cases of Woodward v. Commissioner'36 and United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.37 In Woodward, the individual tax-
payers were part of the controlling group of shareholders of an
Iowa corporation. The corporation's charter was expiring and the
taxpayers' group voted to extend the charter in perpetuity. A mi-
nority shareholder dissented. Under Iowa law, those shareholders
voting in favor of renewing a corporation's existence must purchase
the shares of the dissenters. After negotiations with the dissenter
proved unsuccessful, the majority shareholders filed suit in state
court seeking to have the value of the dissenter's stock determined.
The Iowa trial court did so, and, after the amount was reduced
slightly by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the majority shareholders
purchased the interest of the dissenter at the price fixed.
The taxpayers then attempted to deduct the expenses of the liti-
gation under section 212 as expenses "for the management, con-
servation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income." The Commissioner denied the deduction on the ground
that the appraisal costs were capital expenditures incurred in con-
nection with the acquisition of the dissenter's stock.
In the Supreme Court, the taxpayers, attempting to classify the
expenses as noncapital in nature, argued that the test to be applied
was the primary purpose test of Smith. Aside from its application
in that case, the test had previously been used by the courts princi-
pally in the determination of whether an expenditure was incurred
in "defending or perfecting title to property."'' 8 As in Smith, the
186 397 U.S. 572 (1970), aff'g 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969), afl'g 49 T.C. 377
(1968).
137 397 U.S. 580 (1970), rev'g 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969), aff'g 285 F. Supp.
617 (N.D. IIl. 1968).
138STreas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(c) (1958). Under the "primary purpose" test if lid-
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taxpayers in Woodward argued that the primary purpose of their
expenditure was evaluation of the stock of the dissenter, not title
determination. 1 9
The government in Woodward countered by arguing that the
test to be applied was the "origin and character of the claim" test.
40
That test had been established by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Gilmore,'14 where a husband had attempted to deduct the
expenses incurred in defending claims to his property in a divorce
action. The issue in Gilmore was whether the expenses were busi-
ness expenses for the "conservation . . . of property held for the
production of income,"'14 or were instead personal in nature. There
the Court held that the origin of the claim was the marriage rela-
tionship and that, since this was personal in nature, the deduction
was to be denied. 43 It found it unnecessary to pass upon the ques-
tion of whether a portion of the expenses was capital in nature
since in that event the deduction would have been denied as well. 44
In Woodward, the government contended that the origin of the
claim litigated by the taxpayers was the acquisition of the dissenter's
shares, and that the "character" of the claim - "the amounts to
be paid for capital assets - indisputably was capital in nature."'45
Therefore, the expenses should be capitalized. The Supreme Court
agreed. In affirming the decision of the Eighth Circuit in favor of
the government, the Court noted that generally "costs incurred in
the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset are to be treated as
capital expenditures.' 46 The Court then went on to apply Treasury
Regulation § 1.263 (a)-2(a) which states that "the cost of acquisi-
tion ... of... property having a useful life substantially beyond
the taxable year"' 47 is a capital expenditure.
gation expenses are incurred in a business context they are deductible unless the pri-
mary purpose of the litigation is title defense or perfection. See, e.g., Rassenfoss v.
Commissioner, 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946).
139 397 U.S. at 577.
140 Brief for the Commissioner and the United States at 14-15, Woodward v. Com-
missioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970) and United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S.
580 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Government, Woodward & Hilton].
141 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212.
143372 U.S. at 51.
1441d. at 52.
145 Brief for the Government, Woodward & Hilton at 14-15.
146 397 U.S. at 575.
147 Treas. Reg. § 1.263 (a) -2 (a) (1958).
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In specifically rejecting the primary purpose test, the Court stated:
That uncertain and difficult test may be the best that can be de-
vised to determine the tax treatment of costs incurred in litigation
that may affect the taxpayer's title to property more or less indi-
rectly, and that thus calls for a judgment whether the taxpayer can
fairly be said to be "defending or perfecting tide." Such uncer-
tainty is not called for in applying the regulation that makes the
"cost of acquisition" of a capital asset a capital expense. In our
view application of the latter regulation to litigation expenses in-
volves the simpler inquiry whether the origin of the claim litigated
is in the process of acquisition itself.
A test based upon the taxpayer's "purpose" in undertaking or
defending a particular piece of litigation would encourage resort
to formalisms and artificial distinctions. For instance, in this case
there can be no doubt that legal, accounting, and appraisal costs
incurred by taxpayers in negotiating a purchase of the minority
stock would have been capital expenditures. See Atzingen-White-
house Dairy Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T. C. 173 (1961). Under
whatever test might be applied, such expenses would have dearly
been "part of the acquisition cost" of the stock. . . . Yet the ap-
praisal proceeding was no more than the substitute which state law
provided for the process of negotiation as a means of fixing the
price at which the stock was to be purchased. Allowing deduction
of expenses incurred in such a proceeding, merely on the ground
that tide was not directly put in question in the particular litigation,
would be anomolous.
The standard here pronounced may, like any standard, present
borderline cases, in which it is difficult to determine whether the
origin of particular litigation lies in the process of acquisition.
This is not such a borderline case. Here state law required tax-
payers to "purchase" the stock owned by the dissenter. In the
absence of agreement on the price at which the purchase was to be
made, litigation was required to fix the price. Where property is
acquired by purchase, nothing is more clearly part of the process
of acquisition than the establishment of a purchase price. Thus
the expenses incurred in that litigation were properly treated as
part of the cost of the stock which the taxpayers acquired.'14
Finally, in a footnote, the Court discussed the involuntary nature
of the purchase as follows:
In the first place, the transaction is in a sense voluntary, since the
majority holders know that under state law they will have to buy
out any dissenters. More fundamentally, however, whenever a
capital asset is transferred to a new owner in exchange for value
either agreed upon or determined by law to be a fair quid pro quo,
the payment itself is a capital expenditure, and there is no reason
why the costs of determining the amount of that payment should
148 397 U.S. at 577-79 (footnotes omitted).
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be considered capital in the case of a negotiated price and yet con-
sidered deductible in the case of the price fixed by law.149
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp."5 was the companion case
to Woodward. In Hilton, holders of about six percent of the stock
of the Waldorf Astoria Corporation dissented from a statutory merg-
er of Hilton Hotels Corporation with Waldorf and demanded pay-
ment for their shares.' 5' New York law provided that upon a statu-
tory merger the surviving corporation must purchase the shares of
the dissenters. After the merger was consumated, the surviving
corporation (which retained the name Hilton) made a cash offer to
the dissenters which was rejected by them. The dissenters then be-
gan appraisal proceedings in state court. In connection with the suit,
which was ultimately settled, Hilton incurred consulting, legal, and
other professional service expense, which it deducted under section
162. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the ground
that the payments were capital expenditures.
Both the district court'," and the court of appeals, 15 in holding
for the taxpayer, had applied the primary purpose test. Interesting-
ly, in the Supreme Court, Hilton appeared to concede that the
"origin and character of the claim" test was more appropriate.'
Hilton maintained that under New York law title to the dissenters'
stock had passed prior to the appraisal proceeding and that such
proceeding therefore "did not involve the acquisition of stock.' 155
In this regard, Hilton attempted to distinguish the court of appeals
decision in Woodward (a holding in favor of the government) on
the ground that in Woodward title to the shares did not pass to the
majority shareholders until after the appraisal proceedings had been
concluded. 5 ' Hilton asserted, as a second argument, that the merg-
149 Id. at 579 n.8.
150 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
151 Wron already owned close to 90 percent of Waldorf's stock at the time of the
merger vote.
-W2 285 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
153 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
154 See Brief for Respondents at 4, 10.
1551d. at 3.
156 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8;
Respondent's Motion in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970). Surprisingly, Hilton did not argue (at
least not on brief) that capitalization of the appraisal expenses as part of the cost of the
stock would lead (by virtue of Code section 1032) to their total nondeductibility. Nor
did Hilton point out that the Waldorf stock had little asset significance to the surviving
corporation. See notes 84-94 supra & accompanying text. By contrast, in Woodward,
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er had-also been consummated prior to the appraisal proceedings and
that, therefore, those proceedings were not "functionally related"
to the merger, negating the applicability of the general rule that
costs of a reorganization must be capitalized. 15 7 In short, the tax-
payer's argument was that "the origin of the proceedings was a
debtor-creditor relationship and the character of the proceedings
was the determination of the amount of the debt."' 5 8
The government, in Hilton, apparently confident of success in
Woodward, argued that the Hilton and Woodward transactions
were substantially identical. 59 Indeed, apparently to emphasize this
point, the government filed a joint brief covering both cases. Sup-
porting its petition for certiorari the government had urged that the
expenses in Hilton were to be capitalized as either expenses of re-
organization or as expenses of acquiring a capital asset.' In its
principal brief, however, the government emphasized the latter posi-
tion almost to the exclusion of the former. The main thrust of the
government's argument was simply that passage of title to the dis-
senters' stock under state law was irrelevant and that "the principle
that expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital
assets must be capitalized'' 61 was applicable to both Woodward and
Hilton.
Again the Supreme Court agreed with the government. In a
brief opinion, the Court held, as it had in Woodward, that the pri-
mary purpose test was inapplicable and that the "expenses of litiga-
tion that arise out of the acquisition of a capital asset are capital
expenses, quite apart from whether the taxpayer's purpose in in-
curring them is the defense or perfection of title to property."'1
The "chief distinction" seen by the Court between Hilton and
Woodward was "that under New York law title to the dissenters'
stock passed to Waldorf as soon as they formally registered their
dissent, placing them in a relationship of creditors to the company
for the fair value of the stock, whereas under Iowa law passage of
the dissenter's stock had real asset significance to the taxpayers. And capitalization of
the expenses would increase the taxpayers' basis, thus reducing their taxable gain upon
resale.
i57 Brief for Respondents at 7.
158 Id. at 10.
159 See Brief for the Government, W'oodward & Hilton at 19.
160 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7.
161 Brief for the Govermnent Woodward & Hilton at 18.
162 397 U.S. at 583.
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title was delayed until after the price was settled in the appraisal
proceeding. 'l1a The Court continued:
This is a distinction without a difference. The functional na-
ture of the appraisal remedy as a forced purchase of the dissenters'
stock is the same, whether tide passes before or after the price is
determined. Determination and payment of a price is no less an
element of an acquisition by purchase than is the passage of tide
to the property. In both Woodward and this case, the expenses
were incurred in determining what that price should be, by litiga-
tion rather than by negotiation. The whole process of acquisition
required both legal operations - fixing the price, and conveying
titfe to the property - and we cannot see why the order in which
those operations occurred under applicable state law should make
any difference in the characterization of the expenses incurred for
the particular federal tax purposes involved here.Y3
C. How Was the Transaction in Hilton Viewed?
From the standpoint of this discussion, the Hilton case is of
greater significance since that case is more closely analogous fac-
tually to a stock redemption by a single corporation than is Wood-
ward. The question, of course, is whether anything remains of
the prior law of stock redemption expenses after Hilton.
Unfortunately, there are factors that cut both ways. First, al-
though the Court cited one of the simple acquisition cases,' it is
not clear to what extent the Court was aware of any of the other
lines of authority. " ' Nor is it clear -which view of the transac-
tion the Court was taking in Hilton.
If the Court viewed the appraisal proceeding as merely incident
162-" d.
16 3Id. at 584.
164 Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
:L6 The Supreme Court did not cite any of the partial liquidation or business pur-
pose cases in either Woodward or Hilton. Moreover, only two redemption expense
cases of any kind, one from the partial liquidation line, and one business purpose case,
were cited to the Court, and those citations were only in passing. In its brief in op-
position to the government's petition for certiorari, the taxpayer in Hilton cited Gravois
Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962) (partial liquidation),
and General Pencil Co., 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 689 (1944) (business purpose), along
with a number of other cases, in the following context: "The following situations are
but a few of those wherein legal fees were incurred and were declared to be non-
capital expenditures: ... the acquisition of stock to prevent a stockholder from further
disrupting corporate operations [citing General Pencil]; the working out of a purchase
procedure and valuation formula for the purchase of a majority stockholder's holdings
under a buy-sell agreement [citing Gravois] .... " Brief for Respondents in Opposi-
tion to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6. Before the Court had acted on the gov-
ernment's petition for certiorari in Hilton, it granted certiorari in Woodward. There-
upon, by motion, the taxpayer in Hilton withdrew its opposition to the government's
petition for certiorari, the brief for which had contained the above citations. Hilton
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to the merger (i.e., part of the reorganization), then Hilton may
have little effect on the partial liquidation and business purpose
lines of authority. With regard to the partial liquidation line, it
should be noted that although reorganization expenses have never
been considered deductible, this has not prevented the courts in that
line from holding for the taxpayer where the dominant aspect of a
transaction was felt to be partial liquidation. Moreover, Hilton it-
self did not involve a partial liquidation (at least not in the sense
of section 346), and does not, therefore, even inferentially support
a proposition that in a. section 346 transaction the expenses are to
be considered expenses of reorganization, rather than expenses of
partial liquidation.
As to the business purpose cases, if the Court in Hilton viewed
the expenses merely as incident to the reorganization, then Hilton
might be read to support the analysis of the business purpose line.
By viewing the expenses as incident to the merger, the Court would
be tracing them to the underlying business transaction. Where,
unlike Hilton, the underlying transaction was not capital in nature
the expenses would be deductible.
There is, however, much to indicate that the Court in Hilton
viewed the expenses as subject to capitalization, not as reorganiza-
did not, thereafter, in its principal brief cite Gravois, General Pencil, or any other re-
demption expense case. The government cited Gravois in its principal brief in a
footnote as follows: "Gravois Planing Mill Co., holding that expenditures in connec-
tion with a partial liquidation may be deducted, presents a wholly different question
and is to be contrasted with the subsequent decisions of the Eighth and Seventh Cir-
cuits in United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441, 448-450 (CA. 8), and Alphaco, Inc.
v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244, 245 (C.A. 7)." Brief for the Government, Woodward &
Hilton at 17-18 n.12. (The two latter cases held that expenses of the sale of assets in a
section 337 liquidation could not be deducted.)
Standing alone, these references might seem significant, but in the context of the
principal arguments made by the parties, see note 156 and text accompanying notes 154-
61 supra, they were hardly designed to call the Court's attention to the number of diver-
gent lines of authority discussed earlier. Further, the only citation of any of the cases
in these lines of authority in the lower court decisions in Hilton and Woodward was
in the district court opinion in Hilton. See Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 285
F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1968). There, Gravois (partial liquidation) was cited as
standing for the general proposition that expenses of a reorganization were to be cap-
italized. Even there, the citation was with reference to a point already conceded by the
taxpayer, namely, the capital nature of expenses incurred prior to the merger. There
was also a similar citation (merger expenses must be capitalized) of Mills Estate in
Vermont Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt. 1969), discussed
in note 178 infra. Vermont was decided after the trial court decisions in Woodward
and Hilton, but was not cited by the Supreme Court. Indeed, none of the cases that
were cited by the Court made any reference to the partial liquidation or business pur-
pose cases. Finally, it should be noted that Mr. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the opin-
ion in Gravois and sat on the panel in General Bancshares, was not yet on the Court
when Woodward and Hilton were decided.
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tion expenses, but as expenses connected with the purchase of a
capital asset, i.e., the dissenters' stock. As mentioned previously, al-
though the government in Hilton argued in its petition for certio-
rari that the expenses were to be capitalized either as expenses of
reorganization or as expenses of acquiring a capital asset,16 in its
principal brief the government rested its case almost exclusively
upon the capital asset acquisition analysis."' And the opinion in
Hilton indicates that the Court adopted the latter view. 6 8
Nevertheless, this alone does not answer the basic inquiry. The
question now becomes: Was the Court viewing the transaction in
Hilton as the purchase by a corporation of its own stock or, instead,
viewing the transaction as the purchase by one corporation of the
stock of another? In the Hilton-Waldorf merger, Hilton was sub-
stantially larger than Waldorf and already owned close to 90 per-
cent of Waldorf. Further, the dissenters were shareholders of Wal-
dorf. Thus, it is possible that the Court viewed the transaction as
the purchase by the pre-merger Hilton corporation of the stock of
the Waldorf dissenters. If this is so, the previous cases may be un-
affected. Again, it was well settled prior to Hilton that the expense
of purchasing the stock of another corporation is generally to be
capitalized, and this rule did not seem to hamper the development
of either the partial liquidation or business purpose lines.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how the Court was viewing the
stock purchase. In its Hilton-Woodward brief, the government
referred repeatedly to "acquisition of shares of stock"' ' without
specifying exactly which corporation it thought to be the purchaser.
However, at one point the government said "[I]n order to accom-
plish the merger, Hilton had to acquire all of the Waldorf shares
not held by it.'170  While the reference to Hilton may be to the
166 See text accompanying note 160 supra.
167 See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
16 8 See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
169 See, e.g., Brief for the Government, Woodward & Hilton at 13.
170 Id. at 26. The full paragraph was:
It is not entirely clear what significance Hilton attempts to attribute to the
fact that the dissenter's rights in Woodward arose out of the renewal of a cor-
porate charter rather than a merger. Hilton's contention presumably is that,
unlike Woodward, its case involves a reorganization and not a stock acquisi-
tion. Such an argument hardly comports with the facts, for in order to ac-
complish the merger, Hilton had to acquire all of the Waldorf shares not held
by it. The obligation to exchange something of value for those Waldorf
shares (Hilton stock for the assenting shareholders and cash for the dissenters)
was an inherent part of the merger.
Id. at 25-26.
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surviving corporation, (which of course, in a way, consists of the
substance of both pre-merger corporations) the reference to shares
not held by Hilton seems to support the idea that the government
viewed the transaction as the purchase by the pre-merger Hilton
corporation of the stock held by the outside Waldorf shareholders.
The opinion in Hilton also contains some indication that the
Court viewed the transaction as the purchase by one corporation of
the stock of another.
First, the Court saw little difference between the Hilton and
Woodward transactions. 17' And of course Woodward involved the
purchase of shares by an individual, where the inherent asset signif-
icance of the stock to the purchaser is similar to the inherent asset
significance of the stock of one corporation in the hands of another.
In this regard it should be noted that in stating the general rule,
the Court in Woodward said:
Since the inception of the present federal income tax in 1913,
capital expenditures have not been deductible. . . . Such expendi-
tures are added to the basis of the capital asset with respect to
which they are incurred, and are taken into account for tax pur-
poses either through depreciation or by reducing the capital gain
(or increasing the loss) when the asset is sold.172
As mentioned previously, under the 1954 Code a corporation rec-
ognizes no gain or loss upon the sale of its own stock. Further,
note that the Court in Woodward speaks of a capital asset being
transferred to a new "owner." 17a The concept of ownership, at
least for tax purposes, also seems foreign to a corporation's rights
in its own repurchased shares.
Finally, the opinion in Hilton contains some language to indi-
cate that the Court viewed the transaction as the purchase by one
corporation of stock of another:
Hilton also argues that the appraisal costs cannot be considered
as its own capital expenditures, since Waldorf acquired the shares
(on December 28) before the merger (on December 31). This
argument would carry too far. It is tre that title to the dissenters'
stock passed to Waldorf before that corporation was merged into
the surviving corporation, Hilton. But the stock was never paid
for by Waldorf; rather Hilton assumed all of Waldorf's debts un-
der the merger agreement, and finally paid for the stock after the
appraisal proceeding was settled. If Waldorf's acquisition of the
minority stock interest was not a capital transaction of Hilton's,
then Hilton's payment for the stock itself, as well as the expendi-
'.
7 1 See text accompanying note 163 supra.
172397 U.S. at 574-75.
173 See text accompanying note 149 supra.
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tures made in fixing that price, would lose its character as a capital
expenditure of Hilton's. But Hilton concedes that the payment for
the stock was a capital expenditure on its part. 7 4
On the other side of the argument is the fact that the language
quoted above was followed immediately by these words: "The
debts that Hilton inherited from Waldorf retained their capital
or ordinary character through the merger, and so did the expendi-
tures for fixing the amount of those debts. ' '175  This would indi-
cate that the Court saw the transaction as the purchase by Waldorf
of its own shares followed by the assumption of the resulting lia-
bility by the surviving corporation. Further, one might point to
the Court's citation of Atzingen,7 6 a simple acquisition case involv-
ing only a single corporation's purchase of its own shares. To com-
plicate matters, Atzingen was not again cited in Hilton but, instead,
only in W'oodward,177 where the shares of the dissenters had been
purchased by the other shareholders.178
174 397 U.S. at 584-85 (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 585.
176 Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
17 See text accompanying note 148 supra.
178 With regard to the problem of how to view appraisal proceedings, see Vermont
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt. 1969), where the court
dealt with the question more fully than did the Supreme Court. Vermont was decided
after the Tax Court decision in Woodward and the district court decision in Hilton. In
Vermont, there was a statutory merger. After appraisal proceedings had been com-
pleted, and the dissenters had been paid, one of the dissenters filed suit against the sur-
viving corporation (the taxpayer) alleging that the appraisal of her shares was im-
proper, and that she was entitled to a judgment of $40,000 or a new appraisal. The
suit was ultimately settled for $1,250. In the process, the corporation incurred ap-
proximately $5,000 in legal expenses. The district court held that the legal fees were
deductible, but the settlement amount was not. As to the legal fees, the court re-
jected the origin of the claim test, pointing out that in Gilmore the question was
whether the expenses were personal or business and not whether the expenses must be
capitalized. The court also resisted the government's attempt to characterize the ex-
penses as reorganization expenses, stating that, although they originated in the merger,
they were "not used to create, improve or defend" that merger. Id. at 685. With
respect to the applicability of the Tax Court decision in Woodward, the court stated:
Without deciding the correctness of Woodward or the applicability of
its principle to a case in which a corporation purchases the shares of one of
the corporations from which it was formed, this Court concludes that the pe-
culiar facts of this case make Woodward inapplicable. In 1956, Mrs. Sloan
received a check for $12,500 for her shares of First National Bank of Ben-
nington stock and at that time she cashed the check. Therefore, the sale of
stock from Mrs. Sloan to the plaintiff was completed in 1956. It was not until
three years after the sale that Mrs. Sloan brought suit. Because of the time
lapse, and the fact that Mrs. Sloan had already received payment for her
stock, the legal expenses in connection with the suit are too remote to be
characterized as expenditures for purposes of purchasing a capital asset.
Id. at 685-86 (footnotes omitted). As to the settlement amount, the court held that
it was to be characterized as additional compensation for the shares. The Supreme Court
did not cite Vermont in either Woodward or Hilton.
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What little case law that has come down since Hilton is not
very illuminating on the question of how the Court viewed the facts
before it. The most ambitious attempt at an analysis has come from
Judge Tannenwald of the Tax Court. In Deering Milliken, Inc.,'79
the issue was whether appraisal litigation expenses, incurred upon a
consolidation, could be amortized by the surviving corporation under
section 248. The taxpayer argued, and the court agreed, that the
"origin of the claim" test applied in Woodward and Hilton was a
"'but for" test. "The critical question," said the court, "is 'but for'
what?"'180 The taxpayer argued that "but for" the creation of the
new corporation no appraisal litigation would have occurred and
therefore such costs were "incident to the creation of the corpora-
tion" within the meaning of section 248. Judge Tannenwald dis-
agreed:
[T]he expenses of the appraisal proceedings [in Hilton] originated
in the agreement to consolidate and the resulting rights of the dis-
senters to have their interests acquired, i.e., "but for" that agree-
ment, none of the subsequent events would have occurred and the
expenditures of the appraisal proceedings would not have been
made.181
Judge Tannenwald pointed out that the consolidation in the case
at hand would have occurred under state law whether or not the
dissenters sought appraisal of their stock. Thus "the costs of the
appraisal proceedings were not made to bring [the new corpora-
tion] into being' 1 2 and were "not related in function to the crea-
tion of the new corporate entity."'183 Consequently, amortization un-
der section 248 was denied.
For purposes of analysis, Judge Tannenwald's characterization of
the origin of the transaction in Hilton is not very helpful. The
portion of his language which refers to the "agreement to consoli-
date" indicates that the expenses in Hilton were regarded as reor-
ganization expenses. But the balance of Judge Tannenwald's
opinion is inconsistent with this approach. On the other hand, the
reference to "the resulting rights of the dissenters to have their in-
terests acquired," while cutting in favor of the acquisition cost analy-
sis, does not help determine who the purchaser was thought to be.
17959 T.C. 469 (1972).
180 Id. at 471-72.
181 Id. at 472.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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IV. THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF
A REDEMPTION TRANSACTION
Assuming that the transaction in Hilton was viewed by the Su-
preme Court as the purchase by a corporation of its own stock, it is
possible that the case supplants the prior law of stock redemption
expenses. There may, however, still be hope for corporate tax-
payers attempting to obtain a deduction. If Hilton controls, pre-
sumably the "origin and character" test must be applied to the ex-
penses to determine whether they can be deducted.'4 Indeed, it is
conceivable that the ever expanding application of that test would
have led to its eventual encroachment upon the redemption expense
area of the law in any event. Further, application of the origin
test might bring a semblance of order to this otherwise confused
and perplexing area - at least a minor blessing to tax attorneys,
regardless of deductibility.
It will be remembered that the more recent pre-Hilton author-
ities leaned in favor of allowing deductibility for expenses connected
with a section 346 type of transaction while denying such treat-
ment for expenses of a section 302 transaction. 85
Assume, then, a simple section 346 transaction. A corporation
operates gasoline stations and manufactures men's clothing. The
board of directors decides to take the corporation out of the cloth-
ing business. The corporation adopts a plan under which the assets
of the clothing business are to be distributed to the shareholders
pro rata in exchange for a percentage of each shareholder's stock.
184 It should be noted that while the origin and character test has traditionally been
applied in the context of litigation expenses, there would seem to be no reason why it
should not also be applied to expenses of matters which are resolved prior to the
litigation stage. Thus, the Court in Woodward implied that it would be "anomalous"
to treat expenses of negotiation and expenses of litigation differently where both in-
volve the same subject matter. See text accompanying note 148 supra. Of course,
many stock redemption expenses do not even involve negotiation between the share-
holder and the corporation, e.g., a pro rata distribution pursuant to a section 346 par-
tial liquidation. In such case, it would be difficult to seek out the origin and char-
acter of the "claim", there being no claim. However, there appears to be no reason why
one could not substitute the word "transaction" for "claim" and apply the test on that
basis, i.e., the origin and character of the transaction. Cf. Iowa So. Util. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 333 F.2d 382, 388 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964), where the
test was described as follows:
The Supreme Court tells us that "it is the origin of the liability" and "the
kind of transaction out of which the obligation arose and its normalcy in the
particular business which are crucial and controlling." [Citing Deputy v.
Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), and United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39
(1963)].
18 5 See notes 49-65 supra & accompanying text.
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In effecting the transaction, the corporation incurs legal and account-
ing expenses.
The question would appear to be whether the origin and char-
acter of the transaction is (a) partial liquidation, (b) the acquisi-
tion of shares, or (c) recapitalization. If the origin and chaxacter
is partial liquidation, then the expenses should be deductible on the
same basis as they were before Hilton, i.e. by analogy to expenses
of complete liquidation. If the origin and character of the transac-
tion is the acquisition of shares or recapitalization, the expenses
would have to be capitalized.
However, before applying the origin and character test to the
hypothetical posited above, some analysis of the test itself is called
for. As noted in Deering Milliken, Inc.,8 ' the test has been called
a "but for" test. Unfortunately, this is not helpful in predicting
what the result will be in any given case. Thus, in Gilmore the
Supreme Court found that the origin of the wife's claim relating
to the existence of community property was the marriage relation-
ship, i.e., "no such property could have existed but for the marriage
relationship."' '8 7 However, on the Gilmore facts, one could have as
easily said that "but for" the taxpayer's ownership of the property
there could have been no claim at all. Similarly, in Hilton and
Woodward, the Court said that acquisition of the stock was the ori-
gin of the claim. Yet, in Woodward it could just as easily have
been said that the "but for" element was the extension of the cor-
poration's charter;' and, in Hilton, it could have been said that
"but for" the merger, no claim would have existed 89 (which, inci-
dentally, would lead to the conclusion that the expenses were reor-
ganization expenses, rather than expenses of stock acquisition).
Given the inherent uncertainty of a "but for" test, one is com-
pelled to search for a further rationale implicit in its application
by the Court. In other words, why did the Court in Gilmore say
that the origin of the claim was the marriage relationship, and why
in Woodward and Hilton was the origin of the claim acquisition of
stock?
The answer may be that the test is more than a "but for" test,
186 59 T.C. 469 (1972).
187 372 U.S. at 52.
188 See Gibbs, Legal Fees: Supreme Court Cases Requiring Capitalization Will Have
Broad Impact, 33 J. TAX. 201, 202 (1970).
189 Id.
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and, further, that it is to be applied differently in different contexts.
In this regard, it should be noted that the origin of the claim test
seeks out not only a claim's "origin," but its "character" as well.
In Gilmore, the Court stated the issue as follows: "[Dlid the
wife's claims respecting respondent's stockholdings arise in connec-
tion with his profit-seeking activities ?"190 The word "arise" connotes
more than "but for" causation. Further, the Court paid little atten-
tion to the fact that the character of the claim was in the nature
of ownership of income-producing property. Thus, in a business
versus personal context, the emphasis may be on the origin of the
claim; specifically, on the relationship in which the claim "arises."
On the other hand, in a capital versus noncapital context, the
emphasis may be on the character of the claim. Thus, while at
one point the Court in Hilton said that "the expenses of litiga-
tion that arise out of the acquisition of a capital asset are capital
expenses,"' 9' the bulk of the Court's argument in Hilton and Wood-
ward centered around the fact that the function of the litigation
was to fix the purchase price, and that fixing of the price was
"clearly part of the process of acquisition."'-9 The Court also said
that the appraisal proceedings were a substitute for the process of
negotiation. 13  Such language seems directed more toward the
"character" of the claim, than its "origin." In short, while the
Court uses the same test, in varying contexts that test can produce
very different approaches.
It should also be noted that the "character" portion of the ori-
gin and character test is different from the "primary purpose" test
which was rejected by the Court in Woodward and Hilton.1' The
190 372 U.S. at 51.
'91 397 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added).
192 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 579 (1970). The government in
Hilton and Woodward argued:
[TMhe "origin" of Mrs. Quigley's [the dissenter in Woodward] claim to pay-
ment for her shares, and the claim of the dissenting Waldorf shareholders
with respect to which the appraisal expenses were incurred, was the acquisition
of their stock by Woodward and Hilton. The "character" of the claims -
the amounts to be paid for capital assets - indisputably was capital in nature.
Brief for the Government, Woodward & Hilton at 14-15. It is this last sentence that
the Supreme Court seems to have focused upon when it stated:
[TIhe appraisal proceeding was no more than the substitute that state law
provided for the process of negotiation as a means of fixing the price at which
the stock was to be purchased.
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970) (emphasis added).
193 397 U.S. at 584.
194 See text accompanying note 148 supra.
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character test is an objective test, while the primary purpose test is
subjective in nature. Further, the character test views a transaction
more as a whole, while the primary purpose test is more conducive
to breaking the transaction down into its individual parts. In short,
the character test looks to what is the overriding nature of a trans-
action, while the primary purpose test looks to the motivation of the
parties involved.
Turning back to the hypothetical and beginning with partial
liquidation vis-a-vis share acquisition, the corporate taxpayer de-
scribed above can make some strong arguments that the "origin and
character" of the transaction is partial liquidation and not stock ac-
quisition. First, to the extent that a "but for" test is to be applied
it could easily be said that "but for" the corporate contraction there
would have been no stock redemption. In other words, it could be
said that the transaction "arose" out of the decision to contract the
scope of corporate activities. And corporate contraction is what
makes a partial liquidation analagous to complete liquidation.
As to the character of the transaction, it would seem that the
stock redemption portion of the transaction is at best only inciden-
tal to the plan. Since the redemption is pro rata, neither the cor-
poration nor the shareholders would be concerned with the number
of shares redeemed or the price paid per share. 'Whether one per-
cent of each shareholder's stock is redeemed or ninety-nine percent,
after the transaction is completed there will be precisely the same
number of shareholders as before, each of whom holds exactly the
same percentage interest in the corporation as was held previously.
The only reason for the stock redemption portion of the trans-
action, then, is to obtain sale or exchange as opposed to dividend
treatment for the shareholders. Of course it could be argued that
if reliance is to be placed upon section 346 for the analogy to com-
plete liquidation, one must take the bad with the good; and section
346 appears to require stock redemption. However, even here there
are indications that the redemption requirement is not to be taken
too seriously; at least not seriously enough to characterize the re-
demption portion of the transaction as any more than incidental.
Thus, one court has held that with a pro rata distribution no stock
redemption at all is required for section 346 to operate. 9 ' More-
195 Fowler Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 1962), aff'g
36 T.C. 201, 220-21 (1961) (sole shareholder). But see Jason L. Honigman, 55 T.C.
1067, 1079-80 (1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 69, 74 (6th Cir. 1972), which, in a non pro
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over, the Service has ruled that the number of shares actually re-
deemed by the corporation in a section 346 transaction is irrelevant
in determining gain or loss to the shareholders - at least where
there has been a pro rata redemption. In such case "the total num-
ber of shares deemed to have been surrendered is that number
which bears the same ratio to the total number of shares outstand-
ing as the cash distributed bears to the total fair market value of
the net assets of the corporation immediately prior to the distribu-
tion."'19
6
It should also be noted that there are transactions resembling
section 346 partial liquidations involving no stock redemption at
all. For example, no stock redemption took place in the "D"
reorganization in General Bancshares.9 ' Furthermore, consider-
ing the absence of share acquisition, it is arguable that the holding
of General Bancshares would be unaffected by Hilton. Therefore,
it may still be assumed that expenses of a "D" reorganization are
deductible. And it would make little sense to allow the taxpayer in
a "D" reorganization to deduct its expenses, while denying such
treatment to the taxpayer in a section 346 transaction.
However, before assuming that the share acquisition aspect of
a section 346 transaction is sufficiently incidental to preclude its
identification as the transaction's origin and character, a compari-
rata distribution situation, stated flatly that redemption is required for section 346 to
operate.
See Oscar E. Baan, 51 T.C. 1032, 1044-48 (1969). (Baan consisted of two separate
cases which were consolidated in the Tax Court. One was appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit, aff'd sub nom. Gordon v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 378, 386-87 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970), the other was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, aff'd sub
nom. Baan v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 198 (9th Cit. 1971).) Baan involved a non
pro rata distribution of part of the stock of a newly formed subsidiary to which had
been transferred the assets of a separately conducted business. No stock was redeemed
in the transaction. Taxpayers argued that the transaction fell under section 346(b) and
that, while stock redemption might be required for section 346 (a) to operate, there was
no such requirement in section 346(b). The Tax Court held that the redemption re-
quirement applied to all of section 346. However, the court went on to suggest that
in a pro rata distribution no actual surrender of shares would be required for a "re-
demption." Since the distribution in the case at bar was non pro ratm, it did not fall
within this exception. The Tax Court also held that the distribution did not qualify
under section 346(b) in any event, since less than all of the stock of the subsidiary had
been distributed. On appeal, the Second Circuit considered it "plausible" that the re-
demption requirement did not apply to section 346(b). However, it did not have to
pass on the question, since it agreed with the Tax Court that the other requirements of
section 346(b) were not met.
196 Rev. Rul. 56-513, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 191, 192. See also Rev. Rul. 68-348,
1968-2 CUM. BULL. 141; Rev. Rul. 59-240, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 112; Rev. Rul. 57-
334, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 240.
197 United States v. General Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cit. 1968).
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son to the share acquisition aspect of the transaction involved in
Hilton is necessary. There, it will be remembered, the taxpayer
made a similar argument and it was rejected by the Court. The sec-
tion 346 transaction of the hypothetical, however, is distinguishable
from the transaction in Hilton. The taxpayer in Hilton argued that
legal title to the shares was not in issue in the appraisal proceed-
ing.""8 It could not assert, however, that the dissenters' monetary
interest in the shares was irrelevant. Indeed, the essence of the Su-
preme Court's holding was that the function of the appraisal pro-
ceedings was to determine the price to be paid for the shares, and
this, the Court said, was an element of acquisition.' By contrast, in
a pro rata section 346 distribution, the price of the shares is irrele-
vant. Moreover, the corporation is not interested in acquiring the
shareholder's interest, monetary or otherwise. In sum, there appear
to be rather persuasive arguments that the origin and character of a
straight section 346 transaction is partial liquidation as opposed to
share repurchase.
Next, is it possible to identify the origin and character of the
section 346 hypothetical in terms of recapitalization,200 remember-
ing that the tax treatment flowing from such an identification would
be the same as that flowing from a share acquisition characteriza-
tion? In this regard, what the corporation does with the redeemed
shares may be important. In three of the earlier partial liquidation
cases,201 the courts held that the dominant aspect of the transac-
tions before them was recapitalization. This conclusion was appar-
ently based in part on the fact that in each of those cases the corpo-
ration had cancelled the redeemed stock and had thereby reduced
its stated capital. Thus, a corporation's position might be stronger
if it held the redeemed shares in its treasury. This would avoid
198 See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
199 See text accompanying note 163 supra.
2 0 Rather than apply the "origin and character" test throughout, it might be pos-
sible to take another approach. Once it is decided that the "origin and character" of
the transaction is not "in the process of acquisition" of shares, one could then revert
back to the "dominant aspect" test of Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299
B.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962), to determine whether the "dominant aspect" of the transac-
tion is recapitalization or partial liquidation. However, in the capital versus non-
capital context, the emphasis of the origin and character test appears to be upon the
"character" of a transaction as opposed to its "origin." See notes 192-93 supra & ac-
companying text. And "character" appears sufficiently synonmous with "dominant as-
pect" to allow application of the "origin and character" test throughout, without a sig-
nificant difference in result.
201 Farmers Union Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 861 (1962); Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953);
Standard Linen Service, Inc., 33 T.C. 1 (1959), acquiesced in, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 7.
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the reduction of stated capital that attends share cancellation under
most corporate statutes.202
Noncancellation, however, may create problems for the taxpayer
in presenting its argument that the origin and character of the trans-
action is not stock acquisition. In Hilton, the New York statute pro-
vided that:
the shares or other securities of the resulting or surviving corpora-
tion into which the shares of the objecting stockholder would have
been converted had no objection been made shall, unless the certif-
icate of merger or consolidation shall otherwise provide, be deemed
to have been duly issued in accordance with the terms of such cer-
tificate and reacquired by the resulting or surviving corporation,
and may be held or disposed of by it free of any preemptive rights
of stockholders. 203
This portion of the statute was set out in the district court opinion
and it is conceivable that the Supreme Court decision was influenced
by the fact that the dissenters' stock became treasury stock of the
surviving corporation.
Perhaps the solution to this cancellation dilemma may lie in a
compromise measure. In two of the early partial liquidation
cases, 20 4 there was not only share cancellation but also a charter
amendment. To some extent, this additional factor might have in-
fluenced the conclusion that a recapitalization had taken place.205
If the shares are cancelled without a charter amendment,206 it may
be possible to avoid at least one of the principal factors pointing
in favor of recapitalization, while at the same time avoiding a fac-
tor pointing in favor of share acquisition. It might also be possible
to negate the capital reduction by immediately restoring to stated
capital the amount lost through the share cancellation. 20 7
In any event, distinctions based on whether the shares are can-
celled or held in the treasury will not be determinative in this area.
It should be noted that section 317, which defines redemption,
202 See, e.g., MBCA § 68.
2 0 3 Act of Apr. 14, 1950, ch. 647, § 1, [1950) N.Y. Laws 1501 (now N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 623(i) (McKinney 1963) ).
204 Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953); Standard Linen
Service, Inc., 33 T.C. 1 (1959), acquiesced in, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 7.
205The court in Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th
Cir. 1962), implied that this was a factor cutting in favor of recapitalization charac-
terization in the earlier cases. Id. at 208. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
20 See, e.g., MBCA § 67 (permitting cancellation of shares without article amend-
ment).
207 See, e.g., MBCA § 21 (permitting the board of directors to transfer all or part of
the corporation's surplus to stated capital).
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makes no distinctions on the basis of share cancellation.0 ' This ap-
pears to have been a deliberate attempt by Congress to avoid the
types of distinctions made by some courts under the 1939 Code. 0 9
Aside from the cancellation problem, there is nothing that would
indicate that the origin and character of a section 346 transaction
is recapitalization. No new securities are being issued. Further, no
reshuffling of the interest of any of the shareholders is taking
place;210 the shareholders are in exactly the same position as before,
both vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the corporation. On balance,
then, it would appear that in a simple section 346 transaction, the
origin and character of the transaction is partial liquidation rather
than either share acquisition or recapitalization.
To evaluate the effect of the origin and character test on a sim-
ple redemption situation a different hypothetical is necessary. As-
sume a corporation with three or four shareholders, one of whom
wishes, for personal reasons, to retire from the business. The cor-
poration purchases all of his stock for cash and there is no stock
outstanding which may be attributed to him. There is no corporate
contraction concurrent with the redemption and there is no separate
business purpose for the transaction. It seems clear that after Hil-
ton such a simple section 302 redemption transaction should not
give rise to a deduction for the expenses involved. The origin and
character of such a transaction would seem to be share acquisition
at least to the same extent as the transaction in Hilton. Further, if
the more recent pre-Hilton partial liquidation authorities211 are to
208 Technically, section 317 does not apply to section 346; however, this appears to
have been an oversight in drafting. BITrKER & EUSTICE 51 9.52.
209 Under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Star. 1, and its predecessors, several early
cases held that there could be no "cancellation or redemption" and hence no partial
liquidation, see text accompanying note 40 supra, if the repurchased stock was to be
held in the treasury instead of being cancelled. E.g., W. C. Robinson, 42 B.T.A. 725
(1940). Most of the later cases abandoned that distinction in favor of the view that a
repurchase of stock to be held in the treasury nevertheless constituted a "redemption."
E.g., Wilson v. United States, 257 F.2d 534, 536-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 893
(1958). For a more complete discussion see Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Ac-
cumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. REV. 866, 893 n.80 (1961). Notably, the earlier
view was held, for a time, by the Second Circuit. See Alpers v. Commissioner, 126
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1942). This makes somewhat anomalous the Second Circuit's im-
plication in Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), that the
reduction of capital resulting from cancellation of the repurchased shares was indicative
of a recapitalization, as opposed to a partial liquidation, for the purpose of determining
the deductibility of the expenses. Indeed, two of the judges who decided Mills (Swan
and Chase) had some years before formed the majority in Alpers (holding no partial
liquidation without cancellation).
210 See note 48 supra.
2 11 See note 65 supra & accompanying text.
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be a guide, the character of a simple section 302 redemption would
have to be called recapitalization.
There are some transactions, however, which contain elements
of both section 302 and section 346 in that they involve both a
non pro rata distribution and a corporate contraction. Although
section 346 provides that where a transaction qualifies under both
sections it is to be treated under section 346,212 it is unlikely that this
provision would be determinative of the deductibility of the ex-
penses.21
The difficulty with such a mixed transaction is that it has several
"characters" - partial liquidation, share acquisition, and recapitali-
zation. Thus, the "character" portion of the origin and character
test, alone, will not provide the answer. Perhaps, in such circum-
stances, it might not be inappropriate to seek guidance in the "ori-
gin" portion of the test. Judging by the Supreme Court opinion in
Gilmore,214 the question would be under what circumstances did the
transaction "arise." Thus, in a given case, if it had been determined
that a shareholder's interest in the corporation ought to be decreased,
and the contraction took place to accomplish that goal, the origin
and character of the transaction would be share acquisition or re-
capitalization. On the other hand, if it had been decided that cor-
porate contraction was necessary, and an offer of redemption was
made to all the shareholders, the origin and character of the trans-
action should be partial liquidation, even though the offer turned
out to be accepted by only one or two shareholders.21
Of course, in the context of a closely held corporation, which
goal predominated might be difficult to determine even for those
involved in the decision. Even where such is not the case, the bur-
den of proving that a specific goal was foremost would be extreme-
ly difficult to meet. Finally, making an offer of redemption to all
the shareholders would be no panacea, for, in the context of a close-
212 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 34 6 (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.346-2 (1955).
213 Section 346(c) is apparently designed to avoid having the technical requirements
of section 302 applied to a transaction that meets the requirements of section 346. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.346-2 (1955).
214 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
215 The analysis at this point admittedly calls for somewhat subjective judgements.
When a transaction has several "characters," however, some reference to the motivation
of the parties may be unavoidable. This is not to suggest that the analysis being ap-
plied here is identical to the primary purpose test that was rejected by the Court in
Woodward and Hilton. For, as noted previously, that test, in addition to being sub-
jective, tended when applied to appraisal expenses to be formalistic and to operate on
a rather narrow aspect of the transaction. See text immediately following note 135
supra.
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ly held corporation, it would be hard to prove that there was no
prearrangement that less than all would accept.
Next, what is the effect of the origin and character test in a situ-
ation where there is a strong noncapital business purpose for the
redemption? First, it should be noted that to the extent the origin
and character test is a "but for" test, the presence of a strong bisi-
ness purpose could easily lead to that purpose being identified as the
origin of the transaction. In other words, in a case like General
Pencil,21  the taxpayer could easily argue that "but for" the busi-
ness need, no redemption would have taken place. The real ques-
tion, however, is whether it is possible, after Hilton, to characterize
any simple non pro rata redemption (i.e., one with no corporate
contraction) as anything but share acquisition. From a policy stand-
point, considering the analogies which can be drawn, the answer
should be in the affirmative.
Illustrative are the supply cases. Prior to Hilton, it was fairly
well established that a corporation could deduct from ordinary in-
come any loss sustained on the sale of stock purchased by it in order
to obtain a source of supply of goods . 17  This, of course, was an
exception to the general rule that losses on capital assets are deduct-
ible by a corporation only to the extent of gains on such assets. The
supply cases might also be viewed as an exception to the general
rule that the cost of acquiring a capital asset is a capital expenditure
- the latter rule being the one upon which the decisions in Hilton
and Woodward were based. It may be that the rule of the supply
cases survives Hilton and Woodward to the extent it survived the
general rules prior to Hilton.21 If this is true, it would make little
sense to allow such an ordinary loss deduction and to deny a deduc-
tion for the expenses of a redemption where an equally strong non-
capital business purpose can be shown. Indeed, the decision in Five
Stat2 9 (a business purpose case) was based, at least in part, on an
analogy to the supply cases 2
2 16 General Pencil Co., 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 689 (1944).
2 17 See authorities cited note 115 supra.
218 Indeed, the Service has not revoked the 1958 Revenue Ruling in which it ac-
cepted the proposition that losses on what otherwise would be capital assets (stocks
and bonds) are deductible in full, if the securities were purchased to obtain a source of
supply, or to satisfy other current business needs (such as the purchase of government
bonds to be placed in escrow in order to guarantee performance of a contract entered
into by the taxpayer). Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 275.
219 Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
220 Id. at 727.
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There is also the analogy to proxy fight expenditures, which, it
will be remembered, are deductible provided "such expenditures
were primarily concerned with a question of corporate policy."22'
This rule undoubtedly survives Hilton because of the absence of
any share acquisition in the normal proxy battle."' As noted pre-
viously, in a closely held corporation, matters of corporate policy
can often be settled only by share redemption. And, even where
a proxy fight is a viable alternative to share redemption, the latter
is often the more convenient alternative. Again, it seems inconsis-
tent to allow deductibility for expenses of one method of resolving
questions of corporate policy while denying it for expenses of an-
other method.
Unfortunately, after Hilton, there may be no escaping the argu-
ment that, regardless of the business purpose involved, the char-
acter of a simple non pro rata redemption (one with no corporate
contraction) is share acquisition. The Supreme Court's citation of
Atzingen in Woodward lends some support to this approach, for, it
will be remembered, in Atzingen the court rejected the taxpayer's
assertion that the redemption was necessary to eliminate share-
holder friction.2 Further, the Supreme Court's failure to charac-
terize the expenses in Hilton as reorganization expenses indicates
that the underlying business transaction was not regarded as con-
trolling.
One thing that can safely be assumed with regard to the busi-
ness purpose approach is that the holding of Five Star (that the
purchase price itself may be deducted) runs counter to the spirit
of Hilton and W/oodward. But this alone should not mean that
the expenses of a business purpose redemption should not be de-
ductible. It is possible to regard the purchase price as a distribu-
tion of the corporation's "capital '2 24 while considering the expenses
of the transaction in light of the business need to eliminate the
shareholder involved.
V. THE POST-Hilton CASES
What few decisions that have come down since Hilton in the
stock redemption expense and related areas have not shed much
light on future developments. There have been two cases which
221 Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967 CUM. BULL. 28; see authorities cited note 116 supra.
22 2 BrrTKER & EUSTicE 5 5.04, at 5-10.
223 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
224 In the broad sense of "proprietorship." See note 2 supra.
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might be classified as business purpose cases. There has also been
one case in the partial liquidation line, and one tangentially related
thereto.
In one of the business purpose cases, White Star Drive-In Laun-
dry & Cleaners, Inc. v. United States,2"5 one of the corporation's
50-percent shareholders became dissatisfied with the management
of the corporation and filed suit in state court seeking dissolution of
the corporation. In settlement, the corporation purchased his shares.
Thereafter, the corporation sought to deduct the full purchase price
of the shares. 22 6
The court, applying the origin and character of the claim test,227
held that the expenditure was not deductible. The court, however,
did not hold that the origin of the claim was share acquisition.
Instead, Judge McGarr stated that the state court suit in question
"sought dissolution of the corporation, the appointment of a re-
ceiver, and a distribution of the proceeds from the sale of assets.
It is difficult to imagine a claim which is more capital in nature. 22 8
The result may be correct in light of the fact that the expendi-
ture at issue was the purchase price of the shares. However, the
notion that avoiding liquidation is capital in nature runs counter to
the view taken by most other courts that have considered the ques-
tion. For example, in Western Grain Co. v. Patterson,229 expenses
of defending a shareholder suit calling, inter alia, for dissolution
were held to be deductible. Even in the pre-Hilton simple acquisi-
tion case of Annabelle Candy,2 0 the court implied that expenses of
avoiding liquidation would be deductible.23 ' And, of course, avoid-
ing liquidation was held, in part, to be the basis for allowing the
deduction in the pre-Hilton business purpose cases of Five Star
2 2
and General Pencil.233
225 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,686 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
2 26 No mention was made in the opinion of the expenses of the transaction.
227The court did not cite Hilton or Woodward but relied instead upon Anchor
Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
908 (1971), in which the Seventh Circuit had applied the origin and character test of
Hilton and Woodward to a settlement payment in a suit for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of assets. The deduction was denied in Anchor.
228 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,686.
229 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 73,466 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
2 30 Annabelle Candy Co., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 953 (1961), remanded on other
grounds, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962).
2 3 1 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
232 Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
233 General Pencil Co., 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 689 (1944). See text accompany-
ing notes 102, 108 supra. Cf. Williams & Waddell, Inc. v. Pitts, 148 F. Supp. 778
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The other business purpose case decided after Hilton was Kee-
nan Pipe & Supply Co. v. United States.234 There the court allowed
the corporation to deduct legal fees incurred in the preparation of
a stock purchase agreement which gave the corporation an option
to purchase the shares of its stockholders upon death. The court
said that "[t]he new agreement benefitted [the company] since it
served the purpose of insuring that stock of a deceased Shareholder
would not be sold or transferred to unknown parties who might
cause friction in the corporate management. ' 23 5  No cases were
cited.
Turning to the partial liquidation line: In Thompson & Green
Machinery Co. v. United States,236 the corporation, through three
subsidiaries, was a franchised Caterpillar dealer in both Tennessee
and Alabama. Caterpillar did not want to be represented by the
same interests in two separate territories. To satisfy Caterpillar, the
taxpayer merged with one of its subsidiaries. What happened
thereafter is not entirely clear from the opinion. Apparently, the
stock of the two other subsidiaries was split off to three of the cor-
poration's shareholders in exchange for the stock these three held
in the taxpayer corporation. The district court held that the ex-
penses of the transaction were not deductible. Citing inter alia,
Mills Estate,2-7 General Bancshares,28 and Gravois,39 the court
said:
[I]n those cases where there is both a partial liquidation and a
corporate reorganization, the question becomes a matter of de-
gree .... The transaction is to be viewed as a whole and its dom-
inant aspect is to govern the tax character of the expenditure ....
It appears to the Court from an evaluation of all of the evi-
dence that the motivating and dominant reason for the recited ac-
tivities was the maintaining of the Caterpillar franchise and its
continued value to [the corporation]. If this be so, then the cor-
porate reorganization was effected "for the improvement of a tan-
(E.D.S.C. 1957), discussed at note 103 supra. But cf. United States v. Smith, 418
F.2d 589, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1969) (mere threat of receivership not sufficient for
deductibility of settlement payment where some question existed as to whether liability
for payment was assumed as part of cost of assets acquired; case remanded for determina-
tion on assumption question).
234 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,870 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
285Id. at 87,876.
236327 F. Supp. 1128 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
237 Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
238 United States v. General Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968).
239 Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
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gible or intangible asset." As such, the expenses therefor would
not be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense
under the holding of Mills Estate and the other cases hereinbefore
cited.
However, the principle reason that the taxpayer must fail is that
it has failed to produce satisfactory evidence to qualify its expendi-
tures as an ordinary and necessary business expense.240
Hilton and Woodward were not cited, nor was the origin and char-
acter test mentioned.
The court's exact meaning in the last paragraph quoted above
is difficult to determine. In any event it should be noted that the
transaction in Thompson, although technically falling under sec-
tions 355 and 368, appeared to contain elements of both section
302 and section 346. There was a contraction of the corporate
enterprise and apparently a non pro rata distribution. However,
rather than holding that the "dominant aspect" of the transaction
was share acquisition, recapitalization, or partial liquidation, the
court introduced a new element, namely, whether the expense was
to protect a capital asset already held by the corporation. In ef-
fect the Thompson approach is a business purpose approach, though
unfortunately for the taxpayer in Thompson, that purpose was cap-
ital in nature. Thus, Thompson might strengthen the argument
of a taxpayer who contends that there was a noncapital business
purpose for a share redemption. Naturally, this raises some ques-
tion as to whether the Thompson analysis would be consistent with
application of the origin and character test. On one hand, since
the transaction in Thompson had several "characters" (partial liq-
uidation, share acquisition, and recapitalization), it might not be
inappropriate to determine the context in which the transaction
"arose". That context might be considered the need to satisfy
Caterpillar. On the other hand, quaere whether it is appropriate
to consider the transaction as arising in a context other than that of
partial liquidation, share acquisition, or recapitalization. In other
words, once the several characteristics of the transaction lead to ap-
plication of the origin portion of the test, perhaps one should be
restricted to finding that it "arose" in one of the contexts that gave
rise to the transaction's multi-character quality, rather than permit-
ting the introduction of elements which might otherwise be irrele-
vant. In any event, Thompson should not present any obstacles to
the deductibility of expenses in a straight partial liquidation where
240 327 F. Supp. at 1129-30.
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no capital asset (e.g., a franchise) appears to have been enhanced
as a result of the contraction.
One other case since Hilton relates to the partial liquidation
line of authority. In E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 4 du Pont and Imperial Chemical Industries (Imperial) each
owned 42 percent of the stock of Canadian Industries Limited (In-
dustries). The remaining 16 percent was owned by the public. Pur-
suant to an antitrust decree, du Pont and Imperial were required to
terminate their joint interest in Industries. With several alternatives
open under the decree, the parties chose to divide the physical as-
sets of Industries between du Pont and Imperial. This was accom-
plished as follows: Public ownership of Industries was increased by
10 percent. Then two new corporations were formed as subsidiaries
of Industries. Industries distributed half of its assets to one subsid-
iary and half to the other. Imperial's stock in Industries was re-
deemed by Industries in exchange for the stock of one of the new
subsidiaries. In essence, what occurred was a non pro rata split off
of half of the assets of Industries.
Du Pont attempted to deduct the expenses incurred in develop-
ing and carrying out this segregation of assets plan. The Third
Circuit, in disallowing the deduction, said:
If these legal expenses were incurred in an attempt to defend
and preserve the taxpayer's Canadian business enterprise from the
assault represented by the government antitrust litigation in New
York, they were properly deductible as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense.... If, on the other hand, the expenditures fall within
the general category of reorganization expenses, they should be cap-
italized and are not deductible. . . . Gravois Planing Mill Co. v.
Commissioner . . . . These general principles have recently been
reiterated and applied in Woodward v. Commissioner . . . and
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corporation ....
... Several options were available to the taxpayer, most of which
would have involved a termination of its Canadian business ac-
tivities. The taxpayer chose instead to set up a new Canadian cor-
poration to retain half of the assets and continue in business. The
expense of this reorganization should clearly not be charged against
the income of any one year. Rather, the expenditures resulted in
a benefit to the taxpayer which could be expected to produce re-
turns for many years in the future.242
The court did not cite United States v. General Bancshares Corp.243
241432 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1970).
2421d. at 1058-59.
248388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968). See text accompanying notes 51-58 suppra.
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or United States v. Transamerica Corp.2" However, this may not
be too surprising since there appears to have been no corporate con-
traction in du Pont. Before the transaction, du Pont owned 42
percent of the stock of Industries, and after the transaction du
Pont controlled a corporation which held 50 percent of the assets
of Industries. To be sure, Industries may have suffered a corporate
contraction, but it was du Pont, not Industries, which had paid the
expenses and was seeking the deduction. Therefore, d Pont prob-
ably does not cut against the implication in General Bancshdres
and Transamerica that expenses of a straight section 346 transaction
would be deductible.245
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Prior to the Hilton and Woodward decisions, there were three
distinct lines of cases dealing with the deductibility of stock redemp-
tion expenses. Under the partial liquidation line, the expenses were
deductible if the dominant aspect of the transaction was deter-
mined to be partial liquidation as opposed to reorganization. Un-
der the simple acquisition line, the expenses were not deductible
under any circumstances. Under the business purpose line, they
were deductible if a noncapital business purpose for the transaction
could be shown. The cases in the simple acquisition line could be
reconciled with the more recent cases in the partial liquidation line
under the rationale that expenses of a section 346 type of transac-
tion were deductible, while expenses of a section 302 type of trans-
action were not. The business purpose line could then be re-
garded as adding an exception; if in a section 302 type of trans-
action a showing of strong noncapital business purpose could
be made, the deduction would be allowed.
This prior law may be unaffected by the Hilton and Woodward
decisions. First, the expenses in Hilton might have been viewed
by the Court as expenses of the merger, although there are strong
indications to the contrary. Second, the expenses might have been
viewed as connected with the purchase by one corporation of the
stock of another, and here there are mixed indications of such
a view. But even if Hilton were viewed by the Court as the pur-
chase by a corporation of its own stock, the prior law may remain
substantially intact. Under the origin and character test (with the
244 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968). See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
245 See text accompanying notes 51-61 supra.
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emphasis on character) a section 346 transaction would contain
few if any elements of share acquisition or recapitalization. Thus,
in such a case the presumption would be in favor of allowing a de-
duction. The presumption might be overcome by showing a strong
capital business purpose for the transaction, although the survival
of the business purpose rationale is somewhat questionable. On
the other hand, expenses of a section 302 type of transaction should
presumptively not be deductible after Hilton. Again, the presump-
tion might be overcome by a showing of strong noncapital business
purpose. Finally, expenses of a mixed transaction might be mea-
sured on the basis of the context in which the transaction arose.
In any event, application of the single test of Hilton and Wood-
ward will hopefully bring some order out of the chaos characteristic
of this area of the law.
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